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Liberty in Loyalty: 
A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law 
Evan J. Criddle* 
Conventional wisdom holds that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is a 
prophylactic rule that serves to deter and redress harmful opportunism.  This 
idea can be traced back to the dawn of modern fiduciary law in England and 
the United States, and it has inspired generations of legal scholars to attempt 
to explain and justify the duty of loyalty from an economic perspective.  
Nonetheless, this Article argues that the conventional account of fiduciary 
loyalty should be abandoned because it does not adequately explain or justify 
fiduciary law’s core features. 
The normative foundations of fiduciary loyalty come into sharper focus 
when viewed through the lens of republican legal theory.  Consistent with the 
republican tradition, the fiduciary duty of loyalty serves primarily to ensure 
that a fiduciary’s entrusted power does not compromise liberty by exposing 
her principal and beneficiaries to domination.  The republican theory has 
significant advantages over previous theories of fiduciary law because it 
better explains and justifies the law’s traditional features, including the 
uncompromising requirements of fiduciary loyalty and the customary 
remedies of rescission, constructive trust, and disgorgement. 
Significantly, the republican theory arrives at a moment when American 
fiduciary law stands at a crossroads.  In recent years, some politicians, 
judges, and legal scholars have worked to dismantle two central pillars of 
fiduciary loyalty: the categorical prohibition against unauthorized conflicts 
of interest and conflicts of duty (the no-conflict rule), and the requirement 
that fiduciaries relinquish unauthorized profits (the no-profit rule).  The 
republican theory explains why these efforts to scale back the duty of loyalty 
should be resisted in the interest of safeguarding liberty. 
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Introduction 
Fiduciary relationships are ubiquitous in American law,1 but judges and 
legal scholars have struggled in the past to explain precisely when, why, and 
how fiduciary duties apply.2  Conventional wisdom holds that a relationship 
triggers the fiduciary duty of loyalty whenever one party (the principal) has 
reposed special trust and confidence in another (the fiduciary), thereby 
exposing herself or others (the beneficiaries) to a heightened risk of injury.3  
Yet, aside from a handful of well-established fiduciary relationships such as 
trustee–beneficiary, guardian–ward, and attorney–client, there is 
considerable uncertainty about just how broadly the duty of loyalty extends.4  
Equally troubling, the nature and scope of the duty of loyalty have become 
matters of intense debate.  Some experts argue that the duty of loyalty 
requires fiduciaries merely to avoid conflicts of interest and relinquish profits 
to their principals,5 while others defend a much more robust conception of 
loyalty that would include obligations to deliberate and pursue beneficiaries’ 
interests with affirmative devotion.6  Scholars disagree, as well, over the 
 
1. Fiduciary duties arise, for example, in the law governing trusts, agency, corporations, 
partnerships, pensions, investment banking, bankruptcy, charities and nonprofits, family 
relationships, guardianship, employment, legal representation, and medical care.  See generally 
TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011) (discussing these and other fiduciary relationships). 
2. See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 972, 976 (2013) 
(observing that “we know relatively little about the justification for fiduciary duties” and “[t]he 
boundaries of fiduciary obligation are poorly defined”). 
3. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A fiduciary relation arises 
only if ‘one person has reposed trust and confidence in another who thereby gains influence and 
superiority over the other.’” (quoting Amendola v. Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
4. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1991) (observing that “the 
precise nature of the fiduciary relationship remains a source of confusion and dispute”). 
5. See, e.g., MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE 
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 59 (2010) (affirming that “fiduciary duties are 
proscriptive rather than prescriptive”); Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law 
Without Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY 213, 213–14 (Andrew S. Gold & 
Paul B. Miller eds., 2016) (arguing that the duty of loyalty is comprised exclusively of the no-
conflict and no-profit rules and that loyalty is not a concern of fiduciary law). 
6. See, e.g., Peter Birks, Lionel Cohen Lecture, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. 
L. REV. 3, 11–12 (2000) (“[T]he best way into the trustee’s obligation is through the word ‘altruism.’  
The trustee is under an obligation to act in the interest of another.”); Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. 
Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 LEGAL THEORY 106, 107 (2014) (“A 
fiduciary whose deliberation is not shaped [by the fiduciary obligation to her beneficiary] does not 
live up to her fiduciary obligation, no matter what else she does.”); Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex 
Ante and Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 220–23 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS] (citing marriage as the paradigmatic fiduciary 
relationship because spouses bear robust duties of loyalty to one another that may “evolve, and 
become more demanding, as circumstances develop”). 
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extent to which parties may modify or waive the duty of loyalty by contract,7 
and whether the “pulpit-thumping rhetoric” courts use to describe fiduciary 
duties promotes or undermines the rule of law.8  These debates are beginning 
to spill over from academic commentary into judicial decisions, legislation, 
and uniform laws, sowing inconsistency and uncertainty in American 
fiduciary law.9 
This Article argues that the fiduciary duty of loyalty comes into clearest 
focus when viewed through the lens of republican legal theory.10  The central 
message of republican legal theory is that legal norms and institutions are 
necessary to safeguard individuals from “domination,” understood as 
subjection to another’s alien control (arbitrium).11  Fiduciary power is 
dominating in this sense if a fiduciary is capable of acting “without reference 
to the interests, or the opinions, of” her principal and beneficiaries.12  
Fiduciary law’s classic duty of loyalty combats domination, I argue, by 
ensuring that a fiduciary’s actions are legally required to track the terms of 
her mandate and the interests of her beneficiaries.13 
Although private law scholars have generally neglected the link between 
republicanism and fiduciary law in the past,14 the republican foundations of 
 
7. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. 
& ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary duties are fundamentally contractual duties), Henry 
Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447–49 (1998) (arguing that fiduciary duties are default 
contractual rules), and John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE 
L.J. 625, 655–56 (1995) (asserting that “fiduciary law is contractarian” and fiduciary duties are 
“default norms imposed in juridical relations”), with Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, 
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 
1780–89 (2001) (arguing for limits on contractual waiver by contending that permitting a fiduciary 
“to opt out of [the commitment to pursue the beneficiary’s interests and not her own] undermines 
both the very foundation and the source of the economic value of the concept of a fiduciary 
relationship”), Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 249 (1995) (“[T]he core duty-of-loyalty rules should not be subject to a general 
waiver.”), and Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default 
Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 71 (2005) (arguing that courts should not enforce broad exculpatory clauses 
of fiduciary duties). 
8. Langbein, supra note 7, at 629.  Compare CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 107–09 (rejecting 
moralistic rhetoric in fiduciary jurisprudence as an irrelevant distraction), with Blair & Stout, supra 
note 7, at 1809–10 (defending fiduciary law’s affirmation of moral and social norms). 
9. See infra subpart II(E). 
10. The interpretive methodology employed in this Article is inspired by John Rawls’s concept 
of “reflective equilibrium,” in that it takes the law’s core features at face value and seeks to distill 
the basic normative structure underlying them.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971). 
11. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 55 (1997). 
12. Id. 
13. See id. (observing that under republican theory “an act of interference will be non-
arbitrary,” and accordingly nondominating, “to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and 
ideas of the person suffering the interference”). 
14. By way of illustration, a recent collection of essays on the “philosophical foundations of 
fiduciary law” does not contain a single reference to republicanism as a normative theory of 
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fiduciary law have been hiding in plain sight for centuries.  Generations of 
republican judges,15 political theorists,16 and legal theorists17 have invoked 
 
fiduciary obligation.  See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6.  In previous 
writings on public fiduciary theory, Evan Fox-Decent and I have drawn explicit connections 
between republicanism and fiduciary law.  See, e.g., EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, 
FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 103–04 
(2016) (developing a republican fiduciary theory of international legal norms).  To my knowledge, 
however, this Article is the first to develop these connections systematically and defend 
republicanism as an alternative to theories of fiduciary law that are premised upon classical 
liberalism. 
15. See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900) (describing public offices as “mere 
agencies or trusts”); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880) (“[T]he power of governing is 
a trust committed by the people to the government.”); Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (1 Wall) 441, 450 
(1874) (“The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed 
with them are to be animated in the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, 
and the public good.”). 
16. See, e.g., 1 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 87 (Walter Miller, trans. 1913) 
(characterizing the “administration of the government” as “like the office of a trustee” and “must 
be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one’s care, not of those to whom it is entrusted”); 
THE FEDERALIST Nᴏ. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (affirming that all 
public institutions serve as “agents and trustees of the people”); THE FEDERALIST Nᴏ. 65, at 397 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The delicacy and magnitude of trust which so 
deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration 
of public affairs speak for themselves.”); JAMES HARRINGTON, THE OCEANA AND OTHER WORKS 
147 (1656) (“As an estate in trust becomes a man’s own, if he be not answerable for it, so the power 
of a magistracy not accountable to the People, from whom it was receiv’d, becoming of private use, 
the Common-wealth loses her liberty.”); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 
§§ 142–43, at 75–76 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690) (describing legislative 
power as a “trust” committed to the legislature for the benefit of the commonwealth); JOHN MILTON, 
The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 3, 10 (Martin Dzelzainis ed., Claire 
Gruzelier trans., 1991) (1649) (describing “the power of Kings and Magistrates” as “derivative, 
transferr’d, and committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in 
whom the power yet remaines fundamentally, and cannot be tak’n from them.”); PETTIT, supra note 
11, at 8 (“The commonwealth or republican position . . . sees the people as trustor, both individually 
and collectively, and sees the state as trustee: in particular, it sees the people as trusting the state to 
ensure a dispensation of non-arbitrary rule. . . .”); QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE 
LIBERALISM 109–11 (1998) (discussing “the idea of the state as the name of an artificial person 
whose representatives are authorized to bear the rights of sovereignty in its name”); 2 JOHN 
TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 267 (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995) 
(1755) (describing government as “[a] great and honourable Trust” in which “Honesty, diligence, 
and plain sense, are the only talents necessary for the executing of this Trust; and the public Good 
is its only End”). 
17. See generally, e.g., CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 103–04 (developing an 
interpretive theory of sovereignty under international law as a fiduciary relationship between a state 
and its citizens); EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 112 
(2011) (discussing the state–subject fiduciary relationship); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees 
of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 
295–97 (2013) (characterizing sovereigns as trustees of humanity at large); Evan J. Criddle, 
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEXAS L. 
REV. 441, 446 (2010) (arguing that federal administrative law should promote “fiduciary 
representation,” in which federal officers exercise authority for the benefit of a state’s subjects); 
Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006) 
(reframing the problem of agency discretion around the concept of fiduciary duty); Evan J. Criddle, 
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private fiduciary relationships such as guardianship, agency, and trusteeship 
to explain by analogy how state authority can be reconciled with individual 
liberty.  Just as fiduciary law prevents private law fiduciaries from exercising 
arbitrary power over the interests of their beneficiaries,18 republicans argue 
that public law safeguards liberty by ensuring that public officials wield their 
entrusted powers as a “public trust”—i.e., subject to fiduciary norms of 
loyalty and care.19  Thus, republican legal theory is premised on the idea that 
the primary purpose of private fiduciary law—like public law—is to 
safeguard freedom from domination. 
In contrast, most legal scholars and judges today accept as an article of 
faith that fiduciary law is devoted exclusively to deterring material harm—
an idea that resonates with classical liberalism rather than republicanism.20  
The classical liberal theory of fiduciary law holds that there is nothing 
inherently wrongful about fiduciary self-dealing, provided that conflicted 
transactions do not harm beneficiaries’ material interests.21  Viewed from this 
perspective, fiduciary law prohibits unauthorized conflicts of interest solely 
as a prophylactic measure to deter harmful opportunism and compensate for 
 
Standing for Human Rights Abroad, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2015) (arguing that states may 
employ interstate countermeasures as fiduciaries to protect the human rights of foreign nationals 
abroad); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259 
(2005) (arguing that the fiduciary character of a state’s relationship with its people provides a 
justification for its legal authority); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator 
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013) 
(arguing that legislators are fiduciaries to the public for the purposes of insider-trading law); Gary 
Lawson et al., The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014) 
(describing the Constitution as a fiduciary document requiring equal protection of all citizens); 
Ethan J. Leib et al., Essay, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013) (offering 
a fiduciary theory of the judicial office); Ethan J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into 
Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91 (2013) (applying fiduciary political theory to redistricting); 
Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 
(2016) (assessing the utility and limitations of fiduciary political theory); Robert G. Natelson, The 
Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1088–91 (2004) (arguing that the U.S. 
Constitution is premised on a fiduciary conception of public authority); D. Theodore Rave, 
Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013) (arguing that political representatives 
should be treated as fiduciaries for purposes of redistricting). 
18. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 31–32 (explaining that for republicans the “great evil” that 
legal and political institutions must combat is “domination,” defined as “exposure to the arbitrary 
will of another, or living at the mercy of another”). 
19. See Natelson, supra note 17, at 1088–91 (listing fiduciary duties potentially applicable to 
public officials). 
20. See infra Part II.  This Article uses the term “classical liberalism,” to distinguish the theory 
from other “liberal” theories that are more closely aligned with republicanism.  See Alan Ryan, 
Liberalism, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 360, 360 (Robert E. 
Goodwin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge eds., 2d ed. 2012) (emphasizing liberalism’s diversity). 
21. See infra subpart II(A). 
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courts’ inability to discern whether particular conflicted transactions 
undermined beneficiaries’ interests.22 
This classical liberal theory of fiduciary law, like the republican theory, 
boasts a venerable pedigree.  It features prominently in Keech v. Sandford,23 
the English Chancery Court’s celebrated 1726 decision which ushered in the 
modern era of Anglo–American fiduciary law.24  It also supplies theoretical 
ballast for the first major American fiduciary law case, Davoue v. Fanning.25  
And it has inspired generations of legal academics in the United States to try 
to explain and critique fiduciary law from a purely economic perspective.26  
Nonetheless, as an interpretive theory of fiduciary law—one that purports to 
explain and justify the law’s core features from its own internal point of 
view—the classical liberal theory is unconvincing. 
Classical liberalism struggles, in particular, to explain and justify two 
signature features of the fiduciary duty of loyalty: the categorical prohibition 
against unauthorized conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty (the “no-
conflict rule”), and the requirement that fiduciaries must relinquish profits 
obtained through conflicted transactions (the “no-profit rule”).27  As other 
commentators have observed, there are good reasons to question the 
consensus among scholars of law and economics that these rules are designed 
 
22. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 62 (asserting that “the fiduciary doctrine is 
prophylactic in its very nature”); Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 261, 261, 263–64 (characterizing fiduciary law’s 
prophylactic rules as an outgrowth of equity); Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of 
Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1045–46 (2011) (arguing that “the nature of fiduciary 
governance as a system of deterrence [is] meant to minimize agency costs”). 
23. (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223 . 
24. Id. at 223–24. 
25. 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 257 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). 
26. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 225, 228–35 (discussing the “economics of knowledge” and its 
importance in explaining the fiduciary relationship); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting 
Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990) 
(explaining fiduciary duties in the context of contracting problems); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 
4, at 1074 (applying the economic “principal-agent” model to the concept of fiduciary 
relationships); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 427 (concluding a “‘fiduciary’ relation is a 
contractual one,” and applying “economic assessments of contractual terms and remedies” to 
fiduciary duties); Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 393, 393 (2007) (concluding that when applying the economic perspective to the concept of 
fiduciary duty, “ancient principle” is confirmed, and does not imply an “alteration of the 
conventional position”); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 
299, 313 (1993) (applying economic theory to the issue of “the scope of fiduciary duty”); Robert H. 
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 677–83 (2004) (utilizing 
economic theory, particularly the “principal-agent problem,” and applying agency-cost theory to 
trust law).  See generally Sitkoff, supra note 22 (synthesizing economic theory and fiduciary law). 
27. See, e.g., Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell) (appeal taken from AC) 
(Eng.) (“It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position . . . is not, 
unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a 
position where his interest and duty conflict.”). 
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to achieve optimal harm minimization.28  More fundamentally, classical 
liberalism’s focus on deterrence is an awkward fit with fiduciary law because 
the paradigmatic fiduciary remedies—constructive trust and disgorgement—
are restitutionary remedies, not punitive remedies.29  Taking classical 
liberalism’s normative commitments seriously, therefore, would seem to 
invite legislators and judges to strip fiduciary law down to its foundations 
and reengineer fiduciary duties and remedies from the ground up. 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that this reengineering process 
is already well underway in the United States.  Inspired by classical 
liberalism, the Delaware Supreme Court has replaced the no-conflict and no-
profit rules in corporate law with an “entire fairness” test that allows 
corporate directors to conclude self-interested transactions without the 
consent of either the corporation’s disinterested directors or its 
shareholders.30  The past two decades have also seen a growing number of 
states discard the no-conflict and no-profit rules in agency law and parts of 
trust law.31  These departures from fiduciary law’s traditional requirements 
have been premised on the idea that courts should intervene in fiduciary 
relationships only as strictly necessary to rescue beneficiaries from material 
harm.32 
The republican theory developed in this Article challenges classical 
liberals’ efforts to dismantle traditional fiduciary rules and remedies.  As this 
Article will demonstrate, the fiduciary duty of loyalty reflects the concerns 
of republicanism rather than classical liberalism.  The republican theory of 
fiduciary law resonates with the venerable idea that fiduciaries in both private 
and public law occupy a distinctive office that is constituted, defined, and 
regulated by law.33  Unlike classical liberalism, republicanism bolsters the 
 
28. See infra subpart II(D). 
29. See infra subpart II(D). 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 136–37. 
31. See infra text accompanying notes 141–47. 
32. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 823 (1983) (noting that “courts 
will intervene in the fiduciary relation by requiring the fiduciary to act with loyalty and skill, in the 
entrustor’s best interests”). 
33. See SHELDON AMOS, THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF ROME 291 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. reprt. 1987) (1883) (observing that under Roman law “[t]he office of 
guardian . . . was regarded as a service of public moment, and not of mere private convenience or 
arrangement,” being imposed “as a public burden or duty to be rendered to the State”); 1 CICERO, 
supra note 16, at 85 (“For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be 
conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one’s care, not of those to whom it is entrusted.”); 
Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations, in MAPPING THE LAW 
577, 584–85 (Andrew Burrows & Alan Rodger eds., 2006) (arguing that the English Chancery 
Court’s introduction of “[t]he idea that profit from [a private fiduciary] should be barred can 
plausibly be connected to [Chancellor] King’s experience battling the abuses of [public offices] in 
Chancery”); id. at 595–96 (explaining how English legal norms governing private and fiduciary 
offices developed in tandem during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Jedediah Purdy, 
Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1847 & n.39 (2009) 
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traditional duty of loyalty with its associated remedies by showing how 
fiduciary law neutralizes the domination that would otherwise arise in 
asymmetric relationships premised upon trust and confidence.  A fiduciary’s 
power to exercise entrusted power for and on behalf of her principal (or 
pursuant to authority entrusted to her by law) would engender domination but 
for the fact that fiduciary law compels a fiduciary to honor her principal’s 
instructions and her beneficiaries’ interests.  The republican theory thus 
frames the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a liberty-enhancing safeguard that 
denies fiduciaries the formal legal capacity to exercise arbitrary power.  To 
the extent that American law remains committed to the republican ideal of 
liberty as freedom from domination, legislators and judges today should take 
care to preserve and reinforce fiduciary law’s traditional legal requirements 
and remedies.  
The republican theory also clarifies fiduciary law’s proper scope, 
explaining why some interpersonal relationships that pose a risk of harmful 
opportunism qualify as fiduciary relationships (e.g., trustee–beneficiary), 
while others do not (e.g., manufacturer–consumer).34  In particular, 
republicanism offers a simple test for identifying fiduciary relationships: 
Fiduciary duties apply whenever a party has been entrusted with power over 
another’s legal or practical interests.35  The fiduciary duty of loyalty governs 
relationships that meet this test because without this obligation a fiduciary 
would have the capacity to work a double wrong: she could both (1) harm 
her beneficiary’s legal or practical interests and (2) violate the trust reposed 
in her by treating fiduciary power as an instrument for advancing her own 
purposes.  A fiduciary’s capacity to commit the second type of wrong—
breach of trust—represents a unique form of domination and therefore 
justifies fiduciary law’s distinctive legal obligations and remedies.  While 
other species of private law such as contract, tort, property, and unjust 
enrichment are capable of neutralizing the domination entailed in a private 
party’s capacity for harmful opportunism in an arm’s-length relationship, 
only fiduciary duties and remedies are calibrated to ensure that fiduciaries 
lack the capacity to betray trust in a fiduciary relationship. 
 
(emphasizing how this republican conception of the fiduciary office shaped early American political 
theory).  Scholars of business organization law have observed similarly that Anglo–American 
corporations began as public entities chartered for public purposes.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129–30 (3d ed. 2005) (“Banks, insurance companies, 
water companies, and companies organized to build or run canals, turnpikes, and bridges made up 
the overwhelming majority of these early corporations.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 
17 (1970) (“From the 1780’s well into mid-nineteenth century the most frequent and conspicuous 
use of the business corporation . . . was for one particular type of enterprise, that which we later 
called public utility . . . .”). 
34. See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906, 911–13 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that cigarette manufacturers are not fiduciaries for consumers under Kansas law). 
35. See infra subpart III(A). 
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The remainder of this Article develops the republican theory of fiduciary 
law in several stages.  Part I offers a brief primer on legal republicanism, 
summarizing the tradition’s distinctive conception of liberty as freedom from 
domination.  Part II introduces the classical liberal theory of fiduciary law 
and explains how the classical liberal theory has shaped the development of 
English and American fiduciary law.  Part II also explains why theories of 
fiduciary law that are based on classical liberalism—including economic 
theories—do not offer a persuasive, interpretive account of the duty of 
loyalty.  Lastly, Part III explains how the republican theory both bolsters and 
clarifies the traditional fiduciary duty of loyalty.  In particular, the republican 
theory offers an interpretively persuasive account of the normative 
foundations of fiduciary law, it provides a simple test for identifying 
fiduciary relationships, it clarifies the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and it 
furnishes a principled justification for judicial deference to fiduciaries’ 
discretionary judgments.  In each of these respects, republicanism lays a firm 
theoretical foundation for fiduciary law’s traditional features. 
To be clear, although this Article advances the thesis that fiduciary law’s 
traditional structure reflects republican principles, it does not set out to prove 
that judges in England, the United States, or other former British colonies 
have deliberately drawn upon republican principles as they have developed 
contemporary fiduciary law.  Nor does it attempt to show that republicanism 
can explain or justify every statute, regulation, or judicial decision involving 
fiduciary duties.  Some features of American fiduciary law—particularly in 
the law governing corporations and other business associations—have 
clearly drifted away from the republican theory.  This Article does make the 
case, however, that the traditional fiduciary duty of loyalty addresses 
republican concerns about arbitrary power, and it aims to persuade the reader 
that fiduciary jurisprudence could achieve greater coherence through deeper 
engagement with the republican ideal of liberty as freedom from domination. 
I. Republican Legal and Political Theory: A Primer 
To understand the role that republican theory has played, and might yet 
play, in fiduciary law, we must first appreciate what makes the republican 
tradition distinctive.  Over the centuries, the term “republicanism” has been 
used to capture a diverse collection of ideas, including popular sovereignty; 
representative government; the constitutional separation of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers; civic virtue; inclusive public deliberation; and 
universal citizenship.36  Indeed, the republican tradition has come to embrace 
 
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541–42, 1586 
(1988); see also Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues, 
in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 8 (Samantha Besson 
CRIDDLE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2017  1:40 PM 
1002 Texas Law Review [Vol. 95:993 
so many diverse trends and voices that debates among the tradition’s 
adherents threaten at times to overshadow the tradition’s core contribution to 
legal and political theory.37  At its heart, however, republicanism offers a 
distinctive account of the source and purpose of state authority.  Specifically, 
it asserts that all public officials and institutions derive their authority from 
their people for the purpose of securing individual liberty.38  The state fulfills 
its mission to secure liberty when it enacts and enforces laws that protect its 
people from “domination.”39 
To fully appreciate the republican ideal of liberty as freedom from 
domination, it may be helpful to unpack what this term means for 
republicans.  The leading contemporary exponents of republicanism, Philip 
Pettit and Quentin Skinner, have explained that domination for republicans 
is subjection to another’s “arbitrary power” or “alien control.”40  If another 
person can interfere in your choices as they like with impunity, you are 
dependent on their will and “not sui juris—or not ‘your own person’—in the 
expression from Roman Law.”41  You are no longer capable of acting as 
“your own man,” freely exercising “your own right.”42  Instead, you are 
“under the power of a master” (in potestae domini)—effectively a slave 
rather than a fully emancipated, self-determining agent.43 
 
& José Luis Martí eds., 2009) (describing some of the core themes of republicanism) [hereinafter 
LEGAL REPUBLICANISM]. 
37. For a recent dustup over the meaning of “republicanism,” compare RANDY E. BARNETT, 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE 50–51 (2016) (using the term “republicanism” to capture libertarianism), with Jack M. 
Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 31 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E. 
BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE 
THE PEOPLE (2016)) (contrasting Barnett’s libertarianism with founding-era republicanism based 
on freedom from domination). 
38. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 8 (“The commonwealth or republican position . . . sees the 
people as trustor, both individually and collectively, and sees the states as trustee . . . .”). 
39. M. N. S. SELLERS, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICANISM, LIBERALISM AND THE 
LAW 71–72 (1998) (describing James Madison’s republican vision of liberty). 
40. Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems, in REPUBLICANISM AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 102, 102 (Cécile Laborde & John Maynor eds., 2008); Quentin Skinner, 
Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra, 
at 83, 84–86; see also PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND 
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 1 (2012) (emphasizing “the evil of subjection to another’s will”). 
41. PETTIT, supra note 40, at 7.  The term “sui juris” is often translated as “free from power,” 
meaning not subject to another’s domination.  E.g., MAX KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 76 (Rolf 
Dannenbring trans., 4th ed. 1984). 
42. Skinner, supra note 40, at 86. 
43. Phillip Pettit, Law and Liberty, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note 36, at 39, 44; see 
also LOCKE, supra note 16, § 22, at 17 (asserting that liberty entails not being “subject to the 
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man”); 2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra 
note 16, at 430 (“Liberty is, to live upon one’s own terms; slavery is, to live at the mere mercy of 
another . . . .”). 
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Importantly, republicans contend that domination is wrongful even if 
the empowered party never affirmatively interferes with the dependent 
party’s choices.  The mere fact that the empowered party has the capacity for 
arbitrary interference underscores the dependent party’s vulnerability, 
impressing upon the dependent party’s mind the need to remain within the 
power holder’s good graces.  The dependent party therefore faces “a 
continual state of uncertainty and wretchedness,” characterized by the need 
for constant invigilation, self-abasement, and self-censorship.44  This 
condition of subservience persists even if the empowered party does not 
exercise her power in an arbitrary manner.  Accordingly, subjection to a 
virtuous king or benevolent slave master is incompatible with liberty, 
notwithstanding the fact that the king or slave master may always choose to 
exercise power altruistically for the benefit of their subordinates.  In these 
relationships, the mere presence of alien control is sufficient to render the 
subject or slave unfree.45   
The republican conception of liberty as freedom from domination might 
appear at first glance to be incompatible with government.  Republicans 
argue, however, that public authority does not constitute “alien control” if the 
state is properly “checked” to ensure that it does not serve as an instrument 
of arbitrary control.46  A state that interferes with private choices on a 
nonarbitrary basis to secure a regime of secure and equal freedom does not 
dominate its people.  The key question for republicans, therefore, is whether 
public institutions are hedged by sufficient legal and political safeguards to 
ensure that they lack the formal and practical capacity to exercise power in 
an arbitrary manner.  If state action is “forced to track the avowed or avowal-
ready interests of the interferee,” it is not arbitrary in the relevant sense and 
therefore does not constitute a form of alien control.47  Thus, republicans 
assert that the state can make, adjudicate, and enforce laws that constrain 
individual autonomy without undermining liberty, provided that robust 
safeguards are in place to guarantee that the state cannot disregard the public 
interest with impunity.48 
 
44. 2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 16, at 430; see also Pettit, supra note 40, at 103 
(emphasizing that alien control “invigilate[s] the choices of the controlled agent”). 
45. See, e.g., SELLERS, supra note 39, at 71 (observing that James Madison in the Federalist 
Papers “attributed tyranny to an excess of power, even in service of the common good”). 
46. Pettit, supra note 40, at 117–18. 
47. Id. at 117. 
48. Some contemporary republicans, following a strand of republicanism that can be traced 
back to Aristotle, contend that individuals, to be fully free, must participate in developing the laws 
that govern them so that these laws can be understood as the product of their own authorship.  See, 
e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 322–23 (1996) (arguing that current disenchantment with American politics can be 
alleviated by replacing the liberal, “voluntarist conception of freedom” with a return to republican 
ideas of self-government and civic engagement); Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-
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Laws that deny public institutions the formal authority to wield alien 
control are necessary to secure republican liberty, but they are not sufficient 
to ensure that the state lacks the practical capacity for domination.  Robust 
legal and political institutions are also necessary to reduce the incidence of 
arbitrary interference ex ante and ensure ex post that the state cannot exercise 
alien control with impunity.  Republicans therefore emphasize the 
importance of structural safeguards such as popular elections and inter-
branch checks and balances as safeguards for individual liberty.49  The role 
of courts within republican theory is to affirm legal rules that formally rule 
out domination, while enforcing these rules in a manner that minimizes 
domination in practice.  Because courts—like other public institutions—have 
the practical capacity for arbitrary interference, republicans have argued that 
judicial intervention should be calibrated to guard against overreach, 
ensuring that judicial intervention in public governance minimizes overall net 
domination.50 
An important lesson of the republican tradition is that individual liberty 
in the private sphere is also a product of effective institutional design.  
Republican freedom is “an explicitly political notion of freedom,” Martin 
Loughlin observes; “rather than being a natural or intrinsic human 
characteristic, liberty is . . . created through governmental action,” as the 
state makes and enforces laws to protect individuals from being subject to 
others’ arbitrary power.51  Consequently, legal norms and institutions are 
necessary to protect individuals from domination in the private sphere, just 
as they are necessary to protect individuals from state domination.52 
 
Communitarian Debate, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 159, 165 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 
1989) (“In order to have a free society, one has to replace this coercion with . . . a sense that the 
political institutions in which [citizens] live are an expression of themselves.  The ‘laws’ have to be 
seen as reflecting and entrenching their dignity as citizens, and hence to be in a sense extensions of 
themselves.”).  However, most republicans consider it “more important not to have a master than to 
be a master.”  ISEULT HONOHAN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM 184 (2002).  When legal norms and 
institutions require public officials to exercise their entrusted powers in a manner that is calculated 
to advance the public interest, republicans contend that these officials relate to the public not as 
masters but as public servants.  Id. at 158–61. 
49. See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 11, at 100–01 (noting Alexander Hamilton’s assertion that 
“legislative balances and checks” and “the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies 
of their own election . . . are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican 
government be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided” (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 9, at 72–73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). 
50. See Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1418 (2008) (“[A] decision by courts to intervene in the political process should 
be reconceptualized as a domination-minimizing institutional tradeoff . . . .  Not only does this 
tradeoff result in an overall net minimization of domination, it also constrains judicial intervention 
to the most serious instances of domination.  In this way, the antidomination model guards against 
the danger of judicial overreaching.”). 
51. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 174 (2010). 
52. See John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Republicanism and Restorative Justice: An 
Explanatory and Normative Connection, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 145, 
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Although republican legal and political theorists have lavished attention 
on public law, private law’s equally vital role in securing freedom from 
domination has received less scrutiny.53  The clear implication of republican 
theory, however, is that private law also may promote liberty by ensuring that 
individuals are not consigned to live at the mercy of others.  As Pettit has 
explained, contract law is necessary “not just to facilitate voluntary 
agreements among different agents, but to play a regulative role in 
disallowing contracts that involve terms under which one party has the 
possibility of dominating the other.”54  Tort law duties of care regulate the 
domination that would arise if private parties could harm their neighbors 
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally with impunity.55  Similarly, the law 
of unjust enrichment arguably responds to the threat of alien control by 
compelling individuals to restore property in their possession to the rightful 
owner.56  Property law likewise can be understood to enshrine rights and 
duties and supplies remedies to prevent private parties from wielding 
unilateral control over others’ legally protected interests in resources.57  Thus, 
viewed from a republican perspective, private law enshrines legal rules that 
deny private parties the formal capacity for domination, while tasking courts 
with enforcing these rules in a manner that is calculated to minimize overall 
net domination in practice.58 
 
149 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000) (arguing that the “republican ideal of freedom 
as non-domination” requires “restraining the private power . . . whereby people can be effectively 
protected, informed and empowered in relation to one another”). 
53. See generally, e.g., LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note 36 (providing excellent essays on 
republican approaches to constitutional law, criminal law, and international law, but ignoring 
private law).  Although private law scholars rarely invoke republicanism expressly, David 
Dyzenhaus observes that republican liberty is “akin to the sense of freedom” defended by Kantian 
private law theorists such as Ernest Weinrib and Arthur Ripstein.  See David Dyzenhaus, Liberty 
and Legal Form, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 92, 95–96 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis 
Klimchuk eds., 2014). 
54. PETTIT, supra note 11, at 165. 
55. See David F. Partlett, The Republican Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1409, 1417–18 (2004) (suggesting that tort law responds to republican concerns about domination). 
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). 
57. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 135 (arguing that nondomination best protects private-
property rights). 
58. Republicans have debated whether nondomination is best understood as a constraint on an 
agent’s actions or as a value to be maximized.  See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 97–106 (distinguishing 
these approaches and defending a consequentialist theory).  This Article advances a mixed 
approach.  It endorses the nonconsequentialist view that law, to be legitimate, must respect 
republican liberty by enshrining formal conduct rules that unequivocally affirm each individual’s 
right to freedom from domination.  See infra subparts III(A)–(D).  Because nondomination must be 
secured in practice through fallible legislatures and courts, however, the Article asserts that 
nondomination must also operate as a maximand for the design of decision rules to govern judicial 
review.  See infra subpart III(E).  A thoroughly consequentialist republican theory might generate 
different conclusions regarding the optimal design of fiduciary conduct and decision rules. 
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Generations of republican political theorists have argued that fiduciary 
duties, in particular, preserve freedom from domination.59  For example, 
Pettit asserts that an agent with power of attorney does not dominate her 
principal because she is permitted to exercise this power “only on condition 
that the interference promises to further [her principal’s] interests,” and 
“according to opinions of a kind that [the principal] share[s].”60  
Consequently, an agent does not relate to her principal “as a master,” but 
rather as an extension of the principal’s own self-mastery.61  As Part III of 
this Article explains in greater detail below, the legal requirements of 
fiduciary loyalty formally rule out alien control in fiduciary relationships by 
requiring a fiduciary to exercise her entrusted power in a manner that respects 
the interests of her principal and beneficiaries.  The norms and institutions of 
fiduciary law thus safeguard republican freedom by ensuring that a fiduciary 
lacks the formal and practical capacity to interfere arbitrarily in the affairs of 
her principal and beneficiaries with impunity. 
In sum, republicanism offers a distinctive theory of the purpose of legal 
institutions based on the ideal of liberty as freedom from domination.  
According to republicans, private parties suffer a special wrong whenever 
their legal interests are subject to another’s arbitrary control, irrespective of 
whether that control results in wrongful interference.62  Legal norms and 
institutions are necessary under republican theory to ensure that the powerful 
are unable to interfere arbitrarily in others’ affairs with impunity.  Fiduciary 
law thus contributes to the establishment of a free society by emancipating 
principals and beneficiaries from domination at the hands of those who hold 
entrusted power over their legal or practical interests. 
 
 
59. See sources cited supra note 16. 
60. PETTIT, supra note 11, at 23. 
61. Id. 
62. Republicans disagree about whether noninterference and nondomination are both essential 
components of republican freedom.  See Philip Pettit, Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a 
Difference with Quentin Skinner, 30 POL. THEORY 339, 342 (2002) (arguing that republican 
freedom is concerned solely with domination, while acknowledging Skinner’s claim that 
republicans historically understood freedom to encompass both nondomination and 
noninterference).  Some theorists argue that nonarbitrary interference does not compromise 
freedom, see, for example, PETTIT, supra note 11, at 75–76 (arguing that “[f]reedom as non-
domination is compromised by domination and by domination alone,” not by interference or the 
“influence of conditioning factors”), while others reject this thesis.  See, e.g., Christian List & Laura 
Valentini, Freedom as Independence, 126 ETHICS 1043, 1059 (2016) (criticizing republican 
theories, like Pettit’s, that recast constraints on freedom as no restriction of freedom, “[c]ontrary to 
ordinary-language use”); Evan Fox-Decent, Freedom as Independence 19–23 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (articulating and defending a version of republican freedom that 
includes freedom from interference).  This Article endorses the view that nonarbitrary interference 
compromises freedom, but that such interference is wrongful only if it reflects alien control. 
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II. Classical Liberalism in Anglo–American Fiduciary Law 
Despite the longstanding association between fiduciary concepts and 
republican legal and political theory, private law scholars today rarely 
mention republicanism as a possible theoretical framework for explaining, 
justifying, or critiquing fiduciary law.  Although academics and judges often 
identify factors such as power, trust, dominance, and vulnerability as defining 
features of fiduciary relationships,63 they tend to characterize the no-conflict 
and no-profit rules as “prophylactic” measures that are designed to address 
the risk of harmful opportunism (per classical liberalism),64 rather than as 
liberty-enhancing safeguards that rule out domination (per republicanism). 
This Part examines classical liberalism’s enduring influence on Anglo–
American fiduciary law.  It begins by laying out the tradition’s vision of 
liberty as freedom from interference.  It then considers how classical 
liberalism has shaped fiduciary law’s development in England and the United 
States, and it examines how legal scholars today—including leading 
practitioners of law and economics—have endeavored to explain and justify 
fiduciary duties and remedies based on the normative commitments of 
classical liberalism.  Lastly, this Part explores several important critiques of 
classical liberalism as an interpretive theory of fiduciary law, and it explains 
how the theory’s exclusive focus on wrongful interference has encouraged 
legislatures and courts to set aside fiduciary law’s traditional no-conflict and 
no-profit rules in some areas of American fiduciary law. 
A. Classical Liberalism and Fiduciary Duty 
Contemporary republicans typically present their vision of liberty as an 
alternative to classical liberalism, which focuses on “freedom as 
noninterference.”65  Whereas republicans consider a power holder’s mere 
capacity for arbitrary interference to undermine liberty (whether or not it 
results in actual interference), proponents of classical liberalism contend that 
individual freedom is compromised if (and only if) a person’s choices are 
 
63. See, e.g., Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 102 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing unilateral power and vulnerability); Frankel, supra note 32, at 809–10 (characterizing 
“abuse of power” as “the central problem” of fiduciary law); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical 
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1483 (2002) (suggesting that “the 
strength of [fiduciary law’s] protection varies inversely with the potential for self-help on the part 
of the vulnerable party”). 
64. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22, at 262–71 (describing features of fiduciary law as equitable 
constraints on opportunism); Smith, supra note 63, at 1402 (explaining how the duty of loyalty, 
which serves as the essential aspect of fiduciary duty, serves to mitigate against opportunistic 
behavior by fiduciaries). 
65. See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 11, at 40–50 (contrasting “liberty as non-domination” from 
liberty “as non-interference”). 
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actually constrained by another.66  According to classical liberals, it is the 
incidence or risk of choice-constraining interference—not alien control per 
se—that renders a person unfree.  Consequently, a person may be unfree 
without suffering actual interference only to the extent that another has 
actually interfered, or is likely to interfere, in their affairs to their detriment.67 
In some respects, the republican conception of freedom is narrower than 
the classical liberal conception.  Unlike classical liberals, republicans 
consider an individual’s formal subjection to a benevolent slaveholder to be 
a form of unfreedom even if the slaveholder was disposed to treat the slave 
well and refrain from interference in the slave’s choices.68  In other respects, 
however, the classical liberal conception of freedom is narrower than its 
republican alternative.  For example, any interference in matters of personal 
choice—not just arbitrary interference—compromises freedom under 
classical liberalism.  Accordingly, classical liberals tend to view laws that 
constrain citizens’ choices as limitations on personal freedom even if the laws 
are necessary to protect all members of society from domination.69  Although 
they recognize that legal institutions are often necessary to protect individual 
autonomy from private interference, classical liberals consider state 
intervention in the private sphere to be appropriate only to the extent that 
there is an actual risk of interference in matters of personal choice.70 
Viewed from the perspective of classical liberalism, fiduciary duties 
guard against the possibility that fiduciaries may harm their principals and 
beneficiaries by interfering in their legally privileged choices.  Most 
fiduciaries have a unique capacity for harm because they are enlisted 
precisely to carry others’ choices into execution.71  Accordingly, classical 
liberals argue that the duty of loyalty is designed to address the threats of 
material harm that arise within fiduciary relationships by requiring 
fiduciaries to respect their principals’ choices and their beneficiaries’ 
 
66. See, e.g., MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM 157 (2003) (identifying 
freedom simply as the ability to perform an action). 
67. Ian Carter, How Are Power and Unfreedom Related?, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL 
THEORY, supra note 40, at 58, 61–63; Matthew H. Kramer, Liberty and Domination, in 
REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 31, 42–44. 
68. See Cécile Laborde & John Maynor, The Republican Contribution to Contemporary 
Political Theory, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 1, 4–5 (describing 
Skinner’s and Pettit’s arguments that benevolent slave owners still subject their slaves to 
unfreedom). 
69. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 67, at 65–66 (arguing that there is no reason to privilege the 
common interest over one’s personal interest when determining what counts as an instance of 
unfreedom “unless this reason consists in a moral point of view”); Charles Larmore, A Critique of 
Philip Pettit’s Republicanism, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 229, 234 (2001) (offering taxation as an example of 
state interference for the common good that results in a loss of individual freedom). 
70. See Kramer, supra note 67, at 42 (“[T]he soft-hearted dominator’s superiority is not in itself 
a source of unfreedom; everything hinges on what the dominator does with his superiority.”). 
71. Frankel, supra note 32, at 808–10. 
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interests.72  Arguably, the first principle of agency law, for example, is that 
an agent is required to follow her principal’s instructions.73  Trustees likewise 
are obligated to honor the terms of their trust agreement,74 and corporate 
officers and directors are bound to respect the requirements of their corporate 
charter and bylaws.75  When a principal does not give her fiduciary precise 
instructions, the fiduciary is required to honor the principal’s choices by 
exercising her discretionary powers to advance the principal’s objectives and 
protect beneficiaries’ interests.76  These features of fiduciary law are arguably 
consistent with classical liberalism’s theory of freedom as noninterference. 
Proponents of classical liberalism contend that there is nothing 
inherently wrongful about a fiduciary engaging in conflicted transactions, 
provided that the transactions are consistent with the principal’s objectives 
and do not undermine the beneficiary’s material interests.77  For example, an 
investment manager might find that she can maximize profit for an investor–
beneficiary by investing in a commercial venture in which she also has a 
personal financial stake.  According to classical liberals, the reason why 
fiduciary law requires the investment manager to disclose and receive her 
beneficiary’s consent to the conflicted transactions has to do with the 
challenge of monitoring a fiduciary’s performance: it is often difficult for 
investors and courts to discern whether a particular conflicted transaction was 
actually the best option available to the fiduciary.78  Rather than saddle the 
investor with determining whether a fiduciary’s self-dealing has harmed her 
material interests, the no-conflict rule’s categorical prohibition against 
unauthorized conflicted transactions forces the investment manager to obtain 
the investor’s fully informed consent ex ante or face court-ordered rescission 
or disgorgement ex post.79  Classical liberalism thus presents fiduciary law’s 
 
72. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 32–50, 61–62. 
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (requiring an agent to 
comply with all lawful instructions from the principal). 
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (requiring the 
trustee to administer the trust lawfully and diligently in accordance with the terms of the trust). 
75. See, e.g., Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp., 250 P.3d 531, 533 (Alaska 2011) (affirming 
that a corporate director breached his duty of loyalty by, inter alia, “refusing to comply with 
corporate bylaws”). 
76. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(2) (requiring the trustee to identify the 
duties and powers of the trusteeship, and to effect returns and other benefits for the beneficiaries of 
the trust). 
77. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 108–09, 113–25 (asserting that a fiduciary can breach 
her duty of loyalty without acting immorally); John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty 
of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 934–35 (2005) (arguing that conflicts 
of interest are not “inevitably harmful”). 
78. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 77, at 938 (noting that categorically prohibiting conflicts of 
interest may be appropriate when abuses are difficult to detect). 
79. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 120 (asserting that the no-profit rule is a “prophylactic” 
rule that reflects courts’ recognition “that when a fiduciary has made an unauthorized profit out of 
his fiduciary position there will commonly or ordinarily be a conflict between duty and interest”); 
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traditional no-conflict and no-profit rules as a pragmatic response to the 
epistemic challenge of discerning whether conflicted transactions actually 
respect the principal’s choices and promote the beneficiary’s best interest. 
B. The Rise of Modern Fiduciary Law 
The classical liberal theory of fiduciary law can be traced back to the 
English Chancery Court’s seminal 1726 decision, Keech v. Sandford.80  At 
issue in the case was a lease to Rumford Market, which had been devised to 
a trustee to hold in trust for an infant.81  When the lease was set to expire, the 
trustee allegedly sought to renew the lease on the infant’s behalf.82  The lessor 
refused to renew the lease, however, objecting that he would not be able to 
defend his interests in court against an infant lessee in the event of the lease’s 
breach.83  Finding the path to renewing the lease in the infant’s favor blocked, 
the trustee opted to renew the lease on his own behalf.84  This action had the 
effect of disrupting the infant beneficiary’s “customary, non-legal, but none 
the less firm entitlement [under the principle of ‘tenant’s right’] to roll over 
finite leases and thus maintain possession over long stretches of time across 
 
R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 186 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing the 
availability of the remedies of rescission and disgorgement to victims of the breach of fiduciary 
duties); LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 279 (2005) (emphasizing the necessity of obtaining 
the principal’s express and informed consent before a fiduciary may enter into a self- or other-
interested transaction); cf. Langbein, supra note 77, at 964–65 (“An agent who wants to proceed 
with a conflicted transaction need only persuade the principal to authorize it (which, of course, the 
principal will resist, unless he or she determines the transaction to be in his or her best interest).”). 
80. (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223; see also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1045 n.1 
(charactering Keech as fiduciary law’s “seminal case”).  Although this Article does not afford the 
space for an in-depth look at the history of the fiduciary concept, it bears noting that the republican 
conception of fiduciary loyalty predates the classical liberty theory.  See, e.g., 1 CICERO, supra note 
16, at 85 (noting that one of Plato’s rules for those in charge of public affairs was to “keep the good 
of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every 
action conform to that”).  Indeed, the introduction of formal fiduciary obligations in Roman law 
arguably enshrined Cicero’s republican conception of the fiduciary relationship—albeit long after 
the demise of the Roman Republic.  See R. D. MELVILLE, A MANUAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ROMAN LAW RELATING TO PERSONS, PROPERTY, AND OBLIGATIONS 187–208 (3d. ed. 1921) 
(discussing the legal obligations of guardians under Roman law); David Johnston, Trusts and Trust-
like Devices in Roman Law, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TRUEHAND IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 45, 51 (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998) (discussing the 
Roman law of fideicommissium).  But see ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW 98, 117, 
158 (1995) (arguing that Roman law was pragmatic, unsystematic, and untethered from 
philosophy); Michele Graziadei, Virtue and Utility: Fiduciary Law in Civil and Common Law 
Jurisdictions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 287, 288 (arguing that Roman 
fiduciary law reflected an “economy of honor”). 
81. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.; see also Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations, in 
MAPPING THE LAW, supra note 33, at 577, 581 (explaining why various causes of action could not 
be levied against an infant lessee). 
84. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223. 
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lives and generations.”85  By renewing the lease in his own name and thereby 
breaking the inter-generational chain of possession, the trustee frustrated the 
very purpose of this trust. 
Responding to these concerns, Chancellor King ordered the trustee to 
hold all profits from the lease in a constructive trust for the infant.86  The 
Chancellor acknowledged the extraordinary nature of his determination that 
“the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might not have the lease.”87  
Nonetheless, he stressed that “if a trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have 
a lease to himself, few trust-estates would be renewed to cestui que use.”88  
A general prohibition against conflicted transactions was necessary, in other 
words, to guard against the likelihood that trustees would abuse their 
positions of trust and confidence for their own gain at the beneficiaries’ 
expense.89 
Despite its antiquated facts and terse reasoning, Keech continues to be 
cited widely for the proposition that the fiduciary duty of loyalty operates as 
a prophylaxis against harmful opportunism.90  Consistent with Chancellor 
King’s reasoning, conventional wisdom holds that the no-conflict and no-
profit rules are deliberately over-inclusive measures that deter fiduciaries 
from engaging in opportunism.91  By prohibiting all self-interested 
transactions and profit taking without a beneficiary’s informed consent—
regardless of a fiduciary’s intent and irrespective of whether the beneficiary 
has suffered actual harm—fiduciary law eliminates a fiduciary’s incentives 
to abuse her position for her own gain.92  The no-conflict and no-profit rules 
 
85. Getzler, supra note 83, at 582. 
86. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223–24. 
87. Id. at 223. 
88. Id. 
89. Pleadings in the case suggest that the trustee may have bribed the lessor to deny renewal to 
the infant beneficiary in favor of the trustee.  Joshua Getzler, “As If.”  Accountability and 
Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 973, 984 (2011). 
90. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 121–22 (stating that, after Keech, the no-conflict rule 
“developed into a clear principle of fiduciary doctrine”); ROTMAN, supra note 79, at  61–62; Getzler, 
supra note 83, at 586 (describing Keech as “the fons et origo” of the doctrine prohibiting fiduciary 
profit taking). 
91. See, e.g., R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 111 (1st ed. 1975) 
(asserting that Keech frames the duty of loyalty as a prophylactic rule that “imposes a duty to avoid 
a situation of possible conflict between interest and duty”); T.G. Youdan, The Fiduciary Principle: 
The Applicability of Proprietary Remedies, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 93, 105 (T.G. 
Youdan ed., 1989) (arguing that the “twin policies of prophylaxis and of surmounting the evidence 
problem may justify the finding of personal liability in a fiduciary where his gain is not shown to 
correspond to any loss to the principal” (footnote omitted)). 
92. See In re Primedia Inc. Derivative Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 262 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]he duty 
of loyalty ‘does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting 
from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for 
purposes of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from the breach 
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also prevent a fiduciary from exploiting the fact that she “controls all 
evidence of the relationship and can easily conceal wrongdoing from the 
vulnerable party or the court.”93  Thus, Keech “has been received as 
embodying a policy of prophylaxis, or preventative sanction through profit 
stripping that takes away all incentive for a fiduciary to consider how he 
might gain from his position.”94 
Nearly two centuries after Keech, this theory of fiduciary law received 
perhaps its most iconic expression in Bray v. Ford,95 an 1896 case from the 
English House of Lords.96  The defendant in the case was the Vice-Chancellor 
of Yorkshire College who was found to have violated his fiduciary duty by 
simultaneously receiving payment for services rendered as the College’s 
solicitor.97  In his opinion, Lord Herschell affirmed the “inflexible rule” that 
a fiduciary may not “put himself in a position where his interest and duty 
conflict.”98  Turning to the basis for this rule, Lord Herschell doubled down 
on Chancellor King’s theory of the no-conflict and no-profit rules as a 
prophylaxis against harmful opportunism: 
It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded 
upon principles of morality.  I regard it rather as based on the 
consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in 
such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being 
swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those 
whom he was bound to protect.  It has, therefore, been deemed 
expedient to lay down this positive rule.  But I am satisfied that it 
might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality, 
without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of 
wrong-doing.99 
The idea that the duty of loyalty operates as a prophylaxis against 
harmful opportunism also informed the early development of American 
fiduciary law.  In Davoue v. Fanning, “the foundational American case 
recognizing and enforcing the then-recently-settled English [no-profit] 
rule,”100 Chancellor Kent explained the rule as follows: 
The cestuy que trust is not bound to prove, nor is the court bound to 
judge, that the trustee has made a bargain advantageous to himself. . . .  
 
of confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.’” (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939))). 
93. Getzler, supra note 83, at 586. 
94. Id. 




99. Id. at 51–52. 
100. Langbein, supra note 77, at 944. 
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There may be fraud, . . . and the party [may] not [be] able to prove it.  
It is to guard against this uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to 
remove the trustee from temptation, that the rule does and will permit 
the cestuy que trust to come, at his own option, and without showing 
actual injury . . . .  This is a remedy which goes deep, and touches the 
very root of the evil.101 
In sum, these three cases—Keech, Bray, and Davoue—demonstrate that 
courts in the United Kingdom and the United States have defended the no-
conflict and no-profit rules from the very beginning as measures for 
prophylactically protecting beneficiaries from harm.  Courts recognized that 
fiduciary power posed a serious risk of opportunism because many conflicted 
transactions would, in fact, undercut beneficiaries’ interests, but that it would 
often be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to discern after the fact 
whether this was so in any particular case.  Consistent with classical 
liberalism, therefore, courts sought to explain and justify the no-conflict and 
no-profit rules based primarily on concerns for safeguarding beneficiaries 
from harmful interference. 
C. Classical Liberalism in Contemporary Fiduciary Theory 
Legal scholars today continue to develop theories of fiduciary law that 
reflect the normative commitments of classical liberalism.  Some scholars 
argue that fiduciary duties are designed to promote fidelity to a principal’s 
choices.102  Others emphasize how fiduciary duties prevent harm to 
beneficiaries’ material interests.103  What unites these two camps is the shared 
assumption that the purpose of fiduciary law is to safeguard freedom from 
interference. 
Consider first the idea that fiduciary law promotes fidelity to a 
principal’s choices.  This vision of fiduciary law has been elaborated most 
extensively in Matthew Conaglen’s monograph with the suggestive title 
Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-fiduciary 
Duties.104  Conaglen argues that fiduciary duties are “a subsidiary and 
prophylactic form of protection for non-fiduciary duties”—principally, those 
that arise via contract.105  In Conaglen’s view, the duty of loyalty’s 
 
101. Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 261 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). 
102. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 202 (asserting that the proscriptive nature of 
fiduciary duties indicates that they are concerned principally with “removing temptations, such as 
inconsistent interests or duties, which have a tendency to sway the fiduciary away from proper 
performance of . . . non-fiduciary duties”). 
103. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047 (suggesting that fiduciary law serves to 
protect principals against “two distinct forms of wrongdoing: first, the fiduciary may misappropriate 
the principal’s asset or some of its value (an act of malfeasance); and second, the fiduciary may 
neglect the asset’s management (an act of nonfeasance)”). 
104. See generally CONAGLEN, supra note 5. 
105. Id. at 4. 
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proscriptive no-conflict and no-profit rules do not codify the requirements of 
morality; fiduciaries may profit from unauthorized conflicted transactions in 
a variety of contexts, he argues, without acting immorally.106  Nonetheless, 
these rules are necessary as a practical matter, he argues, to prophylactically 
eliminate temptations that might compromise a fiduciary’s faithful 
performance of her assigned tasks.107 
A second line of scholarship, which has been particularly influential in 
the United States, seeks to explain and justify the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
based on economic theory.  Scholars of law and economics argue that the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty protects beneficiaries from a classic “agency 
problem”: the risk that a fiduciary will harm their interests by 
misappropriating their assets or profit-making opportunities to their 
detriment.108  Early economic theories of fiduciary law claimed that courts 
used fiduciary duties as gap fillers for incomplete contracts to compensate 
for parties’ inability to design contracts that completely specify their 
respective obligations.109  Over time, scholars have refined this contractarian 
account by characterizing fiduciary duties as “off-the-rack” or “standard 
form” contractual default rules that protect unsophisticated parties, enhance 
the efficiency of contract negotiation, and lower beneficiaries’ bonding and 
monitoring costs.110  Fiduciary duties are good candidates to serve as default 
rules, these scholars contend, because they are the kind of legal obligations 
 
106. See id. at 106–41 (asserting that “a breach of fiduciary duty may be committed without the 
fiduciary necessarily acting immorally”). 
107. See id. at 39–40, 61–62 (using the no-conflict and no-profit principles to advance the 
argument “that fiduciary doctrine is prophylactic in its very nature, as it is designed . . . to neutralise 
influences likely to sway the fiduciary”); Smith, supra note 5, at 224 (“The rationale for [fiduciary 
duties] is to prevent fiduciaries from breaching their mandates.”). 
108. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047 (applying “the principal-agent model 
to the fiduciary relationship” and noting that “misappropriation . . . is governed by the duty of 
loyalty”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 197, 198–99, 201 (discussing how the “benefits [of a fiduciary] 
come at the cost of being made vulnerable to abuse” and analyzing how the duty of loyalty lessens 
that risk). 
109. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the courts 
impose fiduciary duties when “it is a reasonable inference that had the parties in advance negotiated 
expressly over the issue they would have agreed that the agent owed the principal the high duty [of 
loyalty]”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 426 (suggesting “that the duty of loyalty is a 
response to the impossibility of writing contracts completely specifying the parties’ obligations”); 
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the 
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991) (arguing 
that “fiduciary duties should properly be seen as a method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts”). 
110. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 26, at 11 (regarding fiduciary duties as consistent with 
“an appropriate implied standard form provision that anticipates what the parties would have drafted 
if they had focused on the situation”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 426–27 (arguing that 
fiduciary duties lower transaction, monitoring, and specification costs); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky 
Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 387 (2007) (describing 
corporate law as “a convenient set of off-the-rack rules that help solve problems”). 
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that a sophisticated party would demand whenever they repose special trust 
and confidence in another.111  By making fiduciary duties default rules, 
fiduciary law also minimizes information costs to third parties, such as 
creditors, who transact with a fiduciary.112 
Scholars who apply economic theory to fiduciary law tend to agree with 
Conaglen that the no-conflict and no-profit rules are over inclusive, because 
they deter fiduciaries from pursing some self-interested transactions that 
would actually promote their beneficiaries’ best interests.113  Nonetheless, 
they argue that the “prophylactic” character of these rules is a necessary 
response to the significant information asymmetries between fiduciaries, 
beneficiaries, and the judiciary.114  Thus, in contrast to Conaglen, who 
focuses on respecting a principal’s choices, scholars of law and economics 
emphasize the duty of loyalty’s deterrent and protective function in 
preventing fiduciaries from harming beneficiaries’ material interests. 
Despite their different points of departure, these two accounts of 
fiduciary law both approach the duty of loyalty from a classical liberal 
perspective.  Both assume that fiduciary duties are concerned exclusively 
with safeguarding parties’ freedom from interference.  Both characterize the 
no-conflict and no-profit rules as “over inclusive” because the rules may 
deter fiduciaries from pursuing some desirable transactions.115  Accordingly, 
both endorse Lord Herschell’s suggestion that the no-conflict and no-profit 
 
111. See Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the 
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 280–81 (1998) (classifying standard 
fiduciary rules as “default mechanism[s]” and arguing that “fashioning a [fiduciary] rule that 
replicates (at least functionally) the allocation that the parties themselves would have bargained for 
ex ante . . . should be an important goal of the courts”). 
112. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay 
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1678 (1989) (arguing that “standardization of 
contract terms through the use of mandatory legal rules reduces information costs for investors”); 
Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 205 (concluding that fiduciary obligations “minimize third-party 
information costs”). 
113. See, e.g., GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. rev. 1993) (“The principal object of the [no-profit] rule is 
preventative . . . .”); Langbein, supra note 77, at 932–33 (arguing that the no-conflict rule results in 
overdeterrence); Sitkoff, supra note 109, at 201 (“[T]he functional core of fiduciary obligations is 
deterrence.”). 
114. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1048 (“Because a fiduciary’s 
misappropriation is profitable and difficult to prove, it is appropriate for fiduciary law to infer 
disloyalty from its appearance.”); Talley, supra note 111, at 282 (arguing that fiduciary law’s 
prophylactic rules are justifiable on the basis that “an optimal legal rule in a private-information 
environment may consciously permit some inefficiencies in order to obviate even greater efficiency 
losses”); Youdan, supra note 91, at 105 (arguing that the “twin policies of prophylaxis and of 
surmounting the evidence problem may justify the finding of personal liability in a fiduciary where 
his gain is not shown to correspond to any loss to the principal” (footnote omitted)). 
115. See Talley, supra note 111, at 282 (noting that “the optimal legal rule will tend . . . to be 
over-inclusive”); cf. CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 68 (discussing how fiduciary duties can “capture 
situations in which no true wrong has been committed”). 
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rules “might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality, 
without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of wrong-
doing.”116  At the end of the day, however, both accounts accept that the 
traditional duty of loyalty is necessary as a prophylactic measure to minimize 
the serious risks of harm that arise within fiduciary relationships.117 
D. Challenges to the Classical Liberal Theory 
Despite classical liberalism’s many virtues as an interpretive theory of 
fiduciary law, it is not a natural fit with traditional fiduciary rules and 
remedies.  Some key features of fiduciary relationships run at cross-purposes 
with the ideal of freedom as noninterference, including the discretionary 
authority that fiduciaries often exercise over their principals’ interests.  There 
are also good reasons to question whether the inflexible no-conflict and no-
profit rules offer an optimal strategy for combatting harmful opportunism.  
Moreover, the traditional fiduciary remedies of constructive trust and 
disgorgement do not track the optimal deterrence conception of fiduciary 
loyalty.  For these and other reasons, it is unlikely that classical liberalism 
can offer a complete justification for the traditional duty of loyalty with its 
associated remedies. 
Under classical liberalism, any form of interference in matters of 
personal choice constitutes a threat to freedom.118  Yet fiduciary law entrusts 
many fiduciaries—including guardians and investment managers—with 
broad discretionary powers to make decisions for and on behalf of their 
principals.119  These fiduciaries are not charged solely with carrying their 
principals’ choices into execution; instead, they make choices for their 
principals and beneficiaries.120  Indeed, it is no great exaggeration to say that 
a fiduciary’s intercession in her principal’s domain of personal choice is the 
entire raison d’être for these categories of fiduciary relationships.  Fiduciary 
decision making might be less problematic from a classical liberal 
perspective when it occurs with a principal’s informed consent.  Some 
fiduciary relationships, however, are established by legislation, judicial 
decree, or unilateral undertaking, rather than through the parties’ voluntary 
 
116. Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell) (appeal taken from AC) (Eng.). 
117. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 70–71 (asserting that the purpose of fiduciary doctrine is 
to “provide prophylactic protection” to minimize harm); Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1049 (declaring 
that “the law requires the fiduciary to be other-regarding” and elaborating that “[w]hat is meant by 
other-regarding is defined by default fiduciary duties of loyalty”). 
118. See supra subpart II(A). 
119. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 42–53 (examining traditional examples of fiduciary 
relationships and the responsibilities and discretion in each). 
120. Id. 
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choice.121  These relationships sidestep a principal’s decision making by 
placing her interests under another’s power without her consent.  They also 
impose legal duties that constrain the fiduciary’s choices.122  The best 
argument for these choice-constraining features of fiduciary law, from the 
perspective of classical liberalism, may be that they are default rules that 
correspond to the hypothetical bargain that a reasonable fiduciary would 
make with her principal.  As this Article explains in Part III, however, the 
triggering conditions and terms of this “hypothetical bargain” are best 
understood as reflecting republican concerns about fiduciaries’ capacity for 
arbitrary interference, rather than the classical liberal ideal of freedom from 
interference. 
Just as classical liberalism struggles to explain fiduciary authority and 
fiduciary duties, there are good reasons to reject the classical liberal thesis 
that optimal deterrence can fully explain or justify the duty of loyalty with its 
associated remedies.  Economic theory suggests that successful deterrence 
depends upon the expected sanction equaling or exceeding the expected gain 
from a fiduciary’s indiscretions.123  However, the expected value of 
unauthorized conflicted transactions will always exceed the expected value 
of disgorged assets.  The reasons for this are obvious.  Some beneficiaries 
will never become aware that their fiduciary has engaged in self-dealing.  
Others will lack a sufficient stake in the matter to justify incurring litigation 
costs, or they will decline to pursue judicial relief for idiosyncratic personal 
reasons.  As long as the probability of effective judicial enforcement is less 
than 100%, the traditional fiduciary remedies of rescission, constructive trust, 
and disgorgement will fail systematically to deter harmful opportunism ex 
ante.124  Thus, if the no-profit rule were designed as a deterrence mechanism, 
we would expect it to be backed by harsher penalties than rescission, 
constructive trust, and disgorgement. 
More troubling still, it is unclear as a purely empirical matter whether 
the no-conflict and no-profit rules actually promote beneficiaries’ material 
interests.  Some legal scholars have speculated that these rules are more likely 
to harm beneficiaries’ interests overall by deterring loyal fiduciaries from 
 
121. See Walter G. Hart, The Development of the Rule in Keech v. Sandford, 21 L.Q. REV. 258, 
258 (1905) (observing that “a vendor of land is [deemed by law] to be a constructive trustee for the 
purchaser” between contract formation and conveyance); Miller, supra note 2, at 982 n.37 (citing 
as examples the relationships between parents and children and between a trustee and beneficiary 
of a declaratory trust). 
122. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 101–77 (examining the duties of fiduciaries, including the 
duties of care and loyalty). 
123. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 
24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 91 (1984) (“An individual will engage in [an] activity if his private gain 
exceeds the expected sanction.”). 
124. See Lionel Smith, Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations, 7 J. 
EQUITY 87, 91 (2013). 
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concluding profit-enhancing (or loss-minimizing) transactions.125  Although 
the no-conflict and no-profit rules may prevent some self-dealing, critics 
have argued that it “also reduces—and in all likelihood to a greater extent—
the number of instances in which fiduciaries who are inclined to act loyally 
can act on their inclinations.”126  Extending this argument, it is possible that 
the no-conflict and no-profit rules might also frustrate the “due performance 
of non-fiduciary duties” in some settings by deterring fiduciaries from 
pursuing transactions that would best satisfy their principals’ instructions. 
John Langbein has pursued this critique of the no-conflict and no-profit 
rules with particular vigor.127  Langbein characterizes the no-conflict rule as 
“Bleak House law, born of the [English Chancery Court’s] despair” over its 
inability to distinguish faithful trust administration from fraud.128   
Today, by contrast, in the wake of fusion and the reform of civil 
procedure, courts dealing with equity cases command effective fact-
finding procedures.129   
 Accordingly, much of the concern voiced by [Chancellor Kent and 
others]—that without the [no-conflict] rule the beneficiary would be 
“not able to prove” trustee misbehavior—is archaic.130   
In Langbein’s view, therefore, the duty of loyalty’s “prophylactic” rules 
are no longer necessary to protect beneficiaries from fiduciary opportunism 
and may actually harm beneficiaries’ interests by taking desirable conflicted 
transactions off the table. 
One final critique of the classical liberal theory of fiduciary law merits 
brief consideration.  As other scholars have noted, there is a fundamental 
conceptual mismatch between classical liberalism’s conception of the no-
profit rule as a prophylactic deterrent measure and the paradigmatic remedies 
for unauthorized profits: constructive trust and disgorgement.131  
 
125. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 77, at 988 (arguing that the present formulation of fiduciary 
loyalty forsakes the underlying purpose of the duty by ignoring that conflicted transactions 
sometimes advance a beneficiary’s best interest). 
126. Smith, supra note 5, at 126 n.15.  Melanie Leslie argues that this concern is vastly 
overstated because fiduciaries would decline to pursue conflicted transactions only in the 
exceedingly rare cases where the costs of obtaining beneficiaries’ informed consent would outweigh 
the expected gains.  See Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response 
to Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 550 (2005). 
127. See Langbein, supra note 77, at 951–52 (arguing that the rules result in “overdeterrence”—
“[b]y penalizing trustees in cases in which the interest of the trust beneficiary was unharmed or 
advanced, the rule deters future trustees from similar, beneficiary-regarding conduct”). 
128. Id. at 947. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See, e.g., Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of 
Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130 L.Q. REV. 608, 625–31 (2014) (explaining that viewing the 
no-profit rule as prophylactic is incompatible with the theories behind constructive trusts and 
disgorgement). 
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Traditionally speaking, courts have conceptualized disgorgement as a 
restitutionary remedy rather than a punitive remedy.132  The purpose of 
disgorgement is simply to effectuate the return of assets that have been 
wrongfully withheld.133  Constructive trust likewise applies when a party has 
been “unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to identifiable property at 
the expense of the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights.”134  Under 
the classical liberal theory, however, it is unclear why profits generated by 
conflicted transactions or misappropriated business opportunities would 
belong, strictly speaking, to beneficiaries rather than to the public fisc.  That 
a beneficiary may suffer harm from the opportunism that generates fiduciary 
profits is self-evident.  Yet compensatory damages, punitive damages, and 
criminal sanctions would seem to be the appropriate remedies to make a 
beneficiary whole and deter future indiscretions—not constructive trust and 
disgorgement.135  Taking classical liberalism seriously would therefore 
require an extreme makeover of fiduciary duties and remedies. 
E. Classical Liberalism’s Challenge to Fiduciary Law 
These lessons have not been lost on legal scholars, legislators, and 
judges in the United States.  As the mismatch between classical liberalism’s 
normative commitments and fiduciary law’s rules and remedies has become 
increasingly apparent, some legal scholars, judges, and legislators have taken 
steps to reshape American fiduciary law in the image of classical liberalism.  
Over the past several decades, classical liberal thinking has profoundly 
shaped the fiduciary law of business organizations, as state legislatures and 
courts have dismantled key features of the duty of loyalty.  For example, 
under the latest formulation of the Delaware Supreme Court’s “entire 
fairness” test, corporate directors may authorize self-dealing transactions 
without obtaining informed consent from either the disinterested directors or 
the corporation’s shareholders, as long as they can convince courts after the 
fact that the transactions were substantially fair.136  Moreover, when a court 
 
132. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining 
that disgorgement “may not be used punitively”). 
133. See id. (“[D]isgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment.”). 
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). 
135. See, e.g., Bardis v. Oates, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 100–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (awarding 
compensatory and punitive damages, recognizing the availability of disgorgement, and noting the 
availability of substantial criminal penalties for breach of fiduciary duty).  Conaglen has argued that 
disgorgement can be rehabilitated as a fiduciary remedy if it is conceptualized as a purely 
prophylactic measure.  See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 76.  As Lionel Smith has explained, 
however, Conaglen’s theory still raises the over-inclusivity and under-inclusivity concerns 
associated with deterrence accounts.  See Smith, supra note 124, at 93, 95. 
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2017); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 
1376 (Del. 1993) (defining the aspects of the entire fairness test as applied to breaches of fiduciary 
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in Delaware determines that a conflicted transaction violates the entire 
fairness test, “the remedy is the difference between the fair value determined 
by the court and the value actually conveyed” (consistent with classical 
liberalism), rather than full disgorgement of all profits (as required under the 
traditional no-profit rule).137  These departures from the traditional duty of 
loyalty resonate with the classical liberal view that state intervention in the 
private sphere is warranted only to the extent that it is absolutely necessary 
to prevent officers and directors from harming a corporation’s material 
interests. 
Drawing inspiration from Delaware corporate law, Langbein has argued 
that trust law’s no-conflict and no-profit rules should also be reframed as a 
rebuttable presumption.138  Under Langbein’s proposed approach, 
unauthorized conflicted transactions would not be subject to rescission, 
constructive trust, or disgorgement if a trustee can establish that the 
transactions promoted her beneficiaries’ best interests relative to other 
available opportunities.139  Implicit in this proposal is a simple premise: there 
is nothing inherently immoral about a fiduciary profiting from a conflicted 
transaction, provided that the transaction also increases the beneficiaries’ 
profits (or minimizes losses) relative to other opportunities.  After all, why 
should courts demand that fiduciaries act in the sole interest of their 
beneficiaries if a conflicted transaction would inarguably promote the 
beneficiaries’ best interests?  Taking the normative commitments of classical 
liberalism at face value, it is hard to see why courts must apply the no-conflict 
and no-profit rules with “[u]ncompromising rigidity.”140  
Recent developments suggest that Langbein’s critique of the no-conflict 
and no-profit rules is gaining traction at the state level.  For example, the 
Model Business Corporation Act and the Uniform Business Organizations 
Code have been revised in recent years to allow fiduciaries to conclude 
conflicted transactions without their beneficiaries’ approval if they can 
 
duty); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (explaining the entire fairness test 
as an overall look at whether the transaction met the aspects of fair dealing and fair price, and which 
factors play into that determination). 
137. D. Gordon Smith, Fiduciary Law and Entrepreneurial Action 3 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author); see also Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 440–42 (Del. 
2000) (explaining that in a merger action, the court must appraise the actual value of the shares in 
determining damages); In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *44–46 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (explaining that the damages awarded in a breach of fiduciary duty case can be 
determined by the difference between the fair value of the shares as determined by the court and the 
value actually conveyed for said shares). 
138. Langbein, supra note 77, at 931–33. 
139. Id. 
140. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  But see Leslie, supra note 7, at 72 
(arguing that Langbein’s approach “would strike a fatal blow to the duty of loyalty as a moral norm, 
and would thus increase instances of trustee opportunism, at least at the margins”). 
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convince courts that the conflicted transactions were objectively “fair.”141  
The Uniform Trust Code likewise no longer presumes that a trustee who 
purchases investments from related entities has violated her duty of 
loyalty.142  Although transactions between a trustee and her relatives, agents, 
and other close associates are “presumed to be affected by a conflict between 
personal and fiduciary interests,”143 this presumption can be rebutted “if the 
trustee establishes that the transaction was not affected by a conflict between 
personal and fiduciary interests.”144  Similarly, the Uniform Power of 
Attorney Act and the Uniform Probate Code no longer apply the no-conflict 
rule to principal–agent relationships.145  Dozens of states and the District of 
Columbia have embraced these changes, implicitly endorsing the classical 
liberal idea that if beneficiaries have suffered “no harm” there is “no foul” 
requiring judicial relief.146  As long as a fiduciary has acted “with care, 
competence, and diligence for the best interest of the [beneficiary],” the 
thinking goes that the beneficiary has no cause to complain.147 
The classical liberal theory of fiduciary loyalty is also beginning to 
shape federal law.  Over the past year, the fiduciary status of investment 
advisers has become a topic of heated political debate following the 
Department of Labor’s (DOL) promulgation of a final rule designating 
certain retirement investment advisers as fiduciaries (the “Fiduciary 
Rule”).148  Under intense lobbying from the financial services community, 
majorities of both houses of Congress voted to revoke the Fiduciary Rule in 
2016, only to see the measure vetoed by President Barack Obama.149  Several 
 
141. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61(b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005) (providing that 
conflicted transactions need “to have been fair to the corporation”); UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 8-507 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (providing that a conflicted transaction is not voidable if “the covered 
party shows that the transaction is fair to the trust”). 
142. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(f) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  Commentary accompanying 
this provision states that it “creates an exception to the [no-conflict and no-profit rules] for trustee 
investment in mutual funds.”  Id. § 802 cmt. 
143. Id. § 802(c). 
144. Id. § 802 cmt. 
145. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5B-114(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT 
§ 144(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006).  But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–.06 
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (retaining the traditional no-conflict rule). 
146. On business organizations, see, for example, 7 COLO. REV. STAT.  § 7-108-501(2)(c) 
(2016); 29 D.C. CODE § 29-1205.07 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13–C § 872(2)(C) (2016); 47 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-861.1(3) (2007). On principal–agent relationships, see, for example, 
ARK. CODE ANN. 28-68-114(d) (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 49A-114(d) (West 2014); 
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.34(D) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1612(D) (2012). 
147. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(d). 
148. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,997 (Apr. 8, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21 (2016)) 
[hereinafter Fiduciary Rule]. 
149. See Tammy Duckworth, Opinion, Isn’t Honesty the Best Policy?, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/opinion/isnt-honesty-the-best-policy.html?_r=0 
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lawsuits were later filed against DOL,150 including one in which the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and other industry groups sought to prevent the 
Fiduciary Rule’s enforcement on the grounds that the rule creates 
“unwarranted burdens and liabilities” for financial advisers.151  To date, none 
of these legal challenges to the Fiduciary Rule have been successful.152  In 
the meantime, however, congressional Republicans introduced a bill to delay 
the Fiduciary Rule’s effective date for two years.153  Incoming President 
Donald Trump also issued a memorandum, instructing DOL to review the 
Fiduciary Rule for possible revision or rescission.154  White House 
representatives and some congressional leaders defended the President’s 
move, arguing that reconsideration was justified because in their view the 
Fiduciary Rule threatened to limit the investment choices available to 
retirement investors and increase management costs.155  Although this 
 
[https://perma.cc/68DM-TKGF] (stating “Republican majorities in the House and Senate pushed 
through a bill to block the Department of Labor’s rule.  On Wednesday [June 8th, 2016], President 
Obama rightly vetoed it.”). 
150. See Jacklyn Wille, Labor Department Faces Five Lawsuits Over Fiduciary Rule, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 9, 2016), https://www.bna.com/labor-department-faces-n57982073912/ 
[https://perma.cc/K5YT-FGED] (describing lawsuits). 
151. Complaint at 2, Chamber of Commerce v. Perez, No. 16-cv-1476 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 
2016), http://www.financialservices.org/uploadedFiles/FSI _Content/Advocacy_Action_Center 
/DOL/DOL-Fiduciary-Rule-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K2T-4N92]. 
152. Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, No. 16-cv-1476, 2017 WL 514424, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 
Feb. 8, 2017). 
153. See David Trainer, The Truth Behind the Push To Delay Fiduciary Rule, FORBES (Jan. 17, 
2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/01/17/the-truth-behind-push-to-delay-
fiduciary-rule/#c9cc79d4b100 [https://perma.cc/6LVH-E98L] (discussing the bill introduced by 
Representative Joe Wilson and providing a link to it). 
154. Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule, Memorandum for the Secretary of 
Labor § 1(b) (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-
memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule [https://perma.cc/MQ8U-X3GY] [hereinafter TRUMP 
MEMORANDUM].  At the time of this writing, the press has reported that the President intends to 
take action to delay implementation of the Fiduciary Rule to facilitate this review.  See The Trump 
Administration Reportedly Plans To Delay the ‘Fiduciary’ Rule for 180 Days, FORTUNE (Feb. 10, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/10/trump-administration-labor-department-fiduciary-rule-delay/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PH5-8BNS] (discussing these developments). 
155. See Press Release, House Fin. Servs. Comm., Statement from Hensarling and Wagner on 
President Trump’s Action to Delay Harmful Fiduciary Rule (Feb. 3, 2017), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=401458 
[https://perma.cc/LG8C-NWPB] (quoting Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling 
as claiming that eliminating the Fiduciary Rule would “empower Americans to make their own 
financial decisions” and lower management costs for retirement investors); Jonnelle Marte, Trump 
Calls for Review of Long-Awaited Rule Meant To Protect Retirement Savers, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2017/02/03/trump-to-target-long-
awaited-rule-meant-to-protect-retirement-savers/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.6206b3a7ee55 
[https://perma.cc/P7EC-2FX5] (citing comments of White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer that 
the rule would have limited the amount of financial services available to the public); Press Release, 
White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Executive Order 
on Fiduciary Rule (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/02/03/remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-fiduciary-rule 
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characterization of the Fiduciary Rule’s impact is controversial, to say the 
least,156 the critical point for present purposes is what it reveals about the 
terms of contemporary debates over fiduciary loyalty.  Without exception, 
critics of the Fiduciary Rule presume that classical liberal values—investor 
choice and private wealth maximization—are the only relevant normative 
considerations.  
Some fiduciary law scholars in the United States have expressed 
consternation about the growing movement to rein in the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty.157  By and large, however, they have defended fiduciary law’s 
traditional rules and remedies without challenging the normative 
commitments of classical liberalism.158  Consequently, debates over the 
wisdom of preserving and extending fiduciary law’s no-conflict and no-profit 
rules have become mired in empirically contested claims about whether 
fiduciary duties and remedies optimally deter opportunism.159  The 
republican tradition offers a more promising theoretical foundation for 
explaining, justifying, and defending fiduciary law’s conventional rules and 
remedies.  To build upon this foundation, however, courts and policy makers 
will have to set aside some cherished myths about the purpose and function 
of fiduciary duties, including Chancellor King’s oft-repeated dictum that the 
duty of loyalty is an over-inclusive prophylactic rule.  In the discussion that 
follows, this Article shows how the republican theory of fiduciary law 
furnishes an interpretively compelling alternative to classical liberalism.  The 
republican theory supports the traditional features of fiduciary loyalty, 
including the proscriptive no-conflict and no-profit rules, and it justifies 
fiduciary law’s distinctive remedies. 
 
[https://perma.cc/QV2Y-ZX7K] (quoting Representative Ann Wagner’s comment: “What we’re 
doing is we are returning to the American people . . . their control of their own retirement 
savings”). 
156. Contrary to the protestations of its critics, the Fiduciary Rule does not limit investor choice 
in any meaningful sense; it merely requires investment advisers to obtain investors’ informed 
consent to particular conflicts of interest.  See generally Fiduciary Rule, supra note 148.  Supporters 
observe, moreover, that the Rule promotes investors’ interests because “conflicted advice” from 
retirement-investment advisers “lowers investors’ returns by as much as 1 percentage point a year—
a loss of $17 billion annually for IRA investors alone.”  Eileen Ambrose, New Rules to Improve 
Retirement Investing, AARP BULL., May 2016, http://www.aarp.org/money/investing/info-
2016/rules-protect-retirement-investments.html [https://perma.cc/S3LF-PS2T] (citing figures from 
the White House Council of Economic Advisers). 
157. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and 
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2742–43 (2006) (arguing that modifying or eliminating 
fiduciary rules undermines beneficiaries’ interests). 
158. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 126, at 544 (challenging amendments to the Uniform Trust 
Code on the grounds that they would harm future beneficiaries rather than challenging classical 
liberalism itself). 
159. Compare Langbein, supra note 77, at 940–41 (arguing that some traditional fiduciary rules 
and remedies were suboptimal in the context of trust law), with Leslie, supra note 7, at 70–71 
(defending traditional fiduciary rules and remedies). 
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III. A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law 
Unlike classical liberalism, republicanism persuasively explains and 
justifies the traditional features of contemporary fiduciary law.  As this Part 
will show, the juridical structure of American fiduciary law reflects 
republican principles, from the idea that “breach of trust” constitutes a 
distinctive legal wrong160 to courts’ reliance on equitable remedies that are 
calibrated precisely to neutralize domination.161  Although classical 
liberalism has chipped away at traditional fiduciary rules and remedies over 
the past several decades—particularly with respect to the fiduciary duties of 
business associations162—American fiduciary law as a whole continues to 
reflect republicanism’s normative commitment to freedom from domination. 
Republican themes also appear in contemporary fiduciary law 
scholarship.  As fiduciary legal theory has matured in recent years, some 
theorists have pushed back against classical liberalism, arguing that fiduciary 
duties cannot be fully apprehended from the perspective of preventing 
harmful interference.  Some have suggested that fiduciary duties and 
remedies reflect formal juridical features of fiduciary relationships.163  Others 
have emphasized the need to protect vulnerable parties from subjection to 
fiduciaries’ unilateral power.164  Still others have emphasized the 
 
160. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16440 (West 2005) (describing a trustee’s violation of the 
duty of loyalty as a “breach of trust”); United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) 
(emphasizing that if a fiduciary “acquires any interest adverse to his principal without a full 
disclosure, it is” actionable as “a betrayal of his trust and a breach of confidence”); Pure Power Boot 
Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 489, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(emphasizing the betrayal of trust in fiduciary disloyalty). 
161. See, e.g., Lewis v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 2016 WL 3676099, at *6–7 (D.D.C. 
July 6, 2016) (affirming disgorgement as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty); In re Opus East 
LLC, 528 B.R. 30, 106–07 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (emphasizing that constructive trust is an 
appropriate remedy for breach of fiduciary duty); Holliday v. Weaver, 2016 WL 3660261, at *2 
(mem. op.) (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) (“Where there has been a clear and serious violation 
of a fiduciary duty, equity dictates not only that the fiduciary disgorge his fees, but also all benefit 
obtained from use of those fees.”). 
162. See supra notes 136–37, 141–47 and accompanying text. 
163. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, 
supra note 6, at 63, 67 (noting that “fiduciary duties have historically been ‘necessarily referable to 
a relationship’”); Lionel D. Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 141, 141–42 (discussing the idea that the legal requirement of 
loyalty should not be called a duty). 
164. See, e.g., ROTMAN, supra note 79, at 84 (analyzing Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 
99 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting)); Deborah A. DeMott, Essay, Relationships of Trust and 
Confidence in the Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1259–60 (2015) (commenting that 
fiduciary relationships “require or engender trust by the beneficiary with a correlative potential for 
abuse by the fiduciary, often . . . effected through deceptive or disingenuous means”); Smith, supra 
note 64, at 1483 (noting that “[t]he law provides protection against opportunistic behavior, and the 
strength of that protection varies inversely with the potential for self-help on the part of the 
vulnerable party”); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4–5 (1975) 
(“The wide leeway afforded to the fiduciary to affect the legal position of the principal in effect puts 
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“entrustment” of other-regarding power as a defining feature of fiduciary 
relationships.165  Each of these contributions gestures toward a republican 
theory in which fiduciary duties and remedies are calculated to safeguard 
parties’ freedom from domination.  Nonetheless, the fact that judges and 
private law scholars have not expressly connected fiduciary law to 
republicanism’s distinctive conception of legal order has impeded previous 
efforts to develop a coherent interpretive theory of fiduciary law. 
This Part shows how republicanism can explain fiduciary law’s 
traditional duties and remedies while also supplying a robust normative 
justification for these features.  The republican theory furnishes answers to 
some of the most important and controversial questions in fiduciary theory 
today, including: (A) the normative foundations of fiduciary law; (B) the 
distinguishing features of fiduciary relationships; (C) the requirements of 
fiduciary loyalty; (D) the theoretical basis for fiduciary law’s traditional 
remedies; and (E) the theoretical basis for fiduciary law’s divergent conduct 
and decision rules.  Taking a step back, however, the republican theory’s 
most important contribution may be to situate fiduciary law within a rich 
philosophical account of the relationship between public institutions, private 
relationships, and private law.166  As this Part will show, private fiduciary 
theory has much to learn from public law theory.  Whereas private law theory 
has underscored the interpersonal nature of fiduciary relationships and has 
provided the most granular analysis of the duty of loyalty’s applications, 
public law theory offers the sharpest account of what it means to hold a 
fiduciary office properly, which is to say, subject to republican norms of 
nondomination.167 
A. The Normative Foundations of Fiduciary Law 
The republican theory posits that fiduciary law empowers principals, 
while also emancipating principals, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries alike from 
domination.  Fiduciary law is concerned not merely with promoting the 
performance of non-fiduciary obligations or preventing material harm, as 
 
the latter at the mercy of the former, and necessitates the existence of a legal device which will 
induce the fiduciary to use his power beneficently.”).  
165. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 4–6; see also J. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 35 
(1981) (describing as essential to a fiduciary relationship the acquisition and use of power by one 
person on the condition that it be used in the best interests of another); Matthew Harding, Trust and 
Fiduciary Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 82–87 (2013) (arguing that “thick” trust, which is 
characterized by the entrustment of discretionary power, characterizes some types of fiduciary 
relationships). 
166. Whether fiduciary duties can successfully eliminate domination in practice depends, of 
course, on whether they are implemented through legal and political institutions that are congenial 
to nondomination.  This Article discusses some implications of this challenge in subpart III(E) 
below. 
167. I am grateful to Evan Fox-Decent for suggesting this formulation. 
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some theorists have assumed.  Rather, it secures freedom from domination 
by affirming that all people are sui juris—free and equal agents whose legal 
and practical interests are entitled to respect. 
1. Empowerment.—Fiduciary law empowers principals in several 
different ways.  First, it enables principals to extend their agency through 
fiduciaries who exercise legal powers and assert legal rights on their 
behalf.168  A principal may decide to entrust a fiduciary with authority to 
conclude transactions on her behalf with third parties (agency);169 manage 
and distribute her assets upon her death (testamentary trusts);170 distribute her 
assets to unspecified third parties for charitable purposes (charitable 
trusts);171 participate in a commercial enterprise (corporations);172 or tend to 
the physical, emotional, educational, and religious upbringing of her children 
(guardianship).173  In each of these settings, fiduciary law makes vicarious 
representation possible by empowering a principal to authorize another party 
to exercise legal rights and assume obligations on her behalf. 
Fiduciary law also empowers principals in situations where they lack 
the legal or practical capacity to designate a fiduciary to act on their behalf.  
For example, children generally lack legal capacity to assert their own legal 
rights, and they are unable to designate an adult to exercise these rights on 
their behalf.174  Fiduciary law addresses this dilemma by providing legal 
mechanisms whereby adults (e.g., guardians) are assigned to serve as 
fiduciaries until children reach adulthood.175  Consider also how fiduciary 
 
168. Cf. Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 761 (2016) (arguing 
that contract law “aims to empower people to use promises as tools to influence one another’s 
actions and thereby to meet a broad range of human needs and interests”). 
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, §§ 2.01–2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (defining a trust as a 
category of fiduciary relationships); id. § 17 (discussing the creation of testamentary trusts). 
171. See id. § 28 (listing the purposes for which a charitable trust may be established as such). 
172. See Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political Culture, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1894 (1989) [hereinafter Incorporating the Republic] (quoting John 
Quincy Adams’s 1832 defense of the corporation as a “truly republican institution” that enabled 
broad participation in capitalist enterprise in a society where “[v]ery few, scarcely any, individuals 
had command of wealth and credit competent to the formation of [manufacturing] establishments” 
(quoting 8 CONG. DEB. app. at 84 (1832) (statement of John Quincy Adams))). 
173. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-202(1) (2017) (“A guardian may be appointed by 
will or other signed writing by a parent for any minor child the parent has or may have in the 
future.”). 
174. See Frederic B. Rodgers, Court-Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 JUDGES’ J., Winter 
2001, at 22, 23 (“Children lack legal capacity to sue and be sued, and courts have the power to 
appoint a guardian or next friend to defend their interests in civil suits.”). 
175. See id. It may seem counterintuitive to characterize fiduciary law as “empowering” 
children, given that the law does not ordinarily require guardians to follow the choices of children 
under their care.  Children would be disempowered indeed, however, if their guardians lacked the 
capacity to serve as fiduciary representatives to exercise their legal rights on the children’s behalf. 
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law responds when a ship runs aground, imperiling cargo that does not belong 
to the shipmaster.  Although shipmasters do not ordinarily have contractual 
relationships with cargo owners, courts have held that shipmasters who are 
unable to communicate with cargo owners may sometimes sell the cargo to a 
third party, acting as an agent of necessity for the cargo owners, in order to 
protect the goods’ value.176  In such cases, fiduciary law empowers principals 
by ensuring that their legal rights can be exercised on their behalf even when 
they lack the legal or practical capacity to select their own fiduciary. 
In other settings, fiduciary law empowers private parties by enabling 
them to benefit from the exercise of legal powers that they do not 
independently possess.  For example, when multiple investors commit assets 
to a pooled investment fund, each retains an equitable interest in the profits 
generated by the fund, but no particular investor has the right to decide 
unilaterally how the fund will be distributed.177  Accordingly, when an 
investment manager winds up a pooled fund and distributes assets, she 
exercises a power that none of the contributing investors can claim 
independently.  Although the investment manager’s authority to resolve 
investors’ competing claims to pooled funds is called into existence by 
investors’ mutual consent, it is not derived from investors’ independent legal 
powers; instead, it is constituted and regulated by fiduciary law itself.178 
Similarly, when parties appoint an arbitrator to resolve a dispute, the 
arbitrator exercises a legal power that neither party would have the right to 
exercise independently under the general principle that no private party is 
authorized to serve as judge and party to the same cause (nemo iudex in sua 
causa).179  Like the investment manager for a pooled fund, an arbitrator’s 
authority to resolve disputes is called into existence by the parties’ common 
consent, but it involves the exercise of a power that private parties do not 
 
176. See, e.g., The “Gratitudine” (1801) 165 Eng. Rep. 450, 455–56; 3 C. Rob. 240, 255–58 
(holding that a shipmaster may pledge cargo as collateral to finance the ship’s repairs “in cases of 
instant and unforeseen and unprovided [sic] necessity,” where “the character of agent [of the cargo’s 
owner] . . . is forced upon [the shipmaster]”); Australasian Steam Navigation Co. v Morse [1872] 8 
Moore PC (NSW) 482, 491–92 (Austl.) (holding same, provided the communication with the cargo 
owner is impossible); China Pacific SA v. Food Corp. of India [1981] 3 All ER 688 (HL) 693 (Lord 
Diplock) (appeal taken from AC) (Eng.); see generally CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 
132–34 (discussing fiduciary duties in the context of emergencies). 
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (providing for the 
termination of a trust if all beneficiaries consent); id. § 79 (providing that the trustee of a pooled 
investment has a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust that governs the trustee’s investments, not a 
duty to any one particular investor). 
178. See id. § 90 cmt. a (noting that trustees have a duty to “preserve the trust property . . . and 
to make it productive,” but failing to enumerate duties to a particular investor). 
179. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995) (characterizing this 
principle as “a mainstay of our system of government”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 
(1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (identifying “certain vital principles in our free Republican 
governments,” including the prohibition against “a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause”). 
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independently possess.180  This power to arbitrate among the rivalrous claims 
of multiple beneficiaries is quintessentially fiduciary in nature.181 
Fiduciary law thus reflects an implicit normative commitment to 
individual empowerment.  By allowing principals to designate fiduciaries to 
act on their behalf, fiduciary law empowers beneficiaries to accomplish 
purposes that they could not achieve as easily—or could not achieve at all, 
legally or practically speaking—without a fiduciary’s assistance.  This 
commitment to individual empowerment is consistent with republicanism’s 
respect for individual agency182 as long as it does not compromise others’ 
equal freedom.183 
Fiduciary law also empowers fiduciaries but in a very different way than 
it empowers principals.  It empowers fiduciaries in the limited sense that they 
receive authorization to exercise legal rights that they would not otherwise 
be entitled to exercise in their personal capacity.  Fiduciary law authorizes a 
fiduciary to exercise fiduciary power solely in an institutional or official 
capacity—as holder of an office that is constituted and regulated by law—for 
a prescribed, other-regarding purpose.184  Fiduciary power is categorically 
different from principals’ power because fiduciaries are not free to pursue 
their own ends; a constitutive feature of fiduciary power is that the law 
permits its exercise only in a manner that is faithful to the fiduciary’s mandate 
and solicitous of beneficiaries’ legal and practical interests.185  Fiduciary law 
thus confers power on fiduciaries to act in a manner that affects others’ legal 
 
180. See James Allsop, The Authority of the Arbitrator, 30 ARB. INT’L 639, 648 (2014) 
(describing the power of the arbitrator, which, while derived from the agreement of the parties, 
necessarily encompasses authority the parties themselves do not have, such as the power to 
determine the parties’ rights in the dispute). 
181. See Atkins v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 694 F.3d 557, 569 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that “a trustee deadlock over [the Employment Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA)] eligibility matters . . . must be submitted to [an arbitrator as fiduciary]” (quoting 
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 338 (1981)); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY OP. 79-
66A, at 1–3 (Sept. 14, 1979) (concluding that an arbitrator who decides the question of a 
participant’s entitlement to ERISA plan benefits acts as a fiduciary); cf. Leib et al., supra note 17, 
at 718–19 (arguing that the judicial office should be understood as a public trust). 
182. A commitment to individual empowerment is not unique to republicanism.  This feature 
of fiduciary law is compatible with classical liberalism and a variety of other normative theories. 
183. Republicanism thus supports liberty-reinforcing constraints on individual empowerment, 
including reasonable antitrust regulations.  See Incorporating the Republic, supra note 172, at 1893–
902 (discussing nineteenth-century debates over whether the corporation, “with its potential for 
dominant market power,” was congenial to republican freedom). 
184. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 18–19 (discussing the institutional, 
purposive, and other-regarding characteristics of fiduciary power); Getzler, supra note 83, at 585 
(observing that Chancellor King’s “idea that profit from office should be barred [in fiduciary 
relationships] can plausibly be connected to [his] experience battling [corruption of public 
offices]”). 
185. See SHEPHERD, supra note 165, at 35 (defining fiduciary power as conditioned on using 
such power in the best interests of another). 
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and practical interests, while constituting that power juridically in a manner 
that formally rules out alien control. 
2. Emancipation.—As a practical matter, of course, fiduciaries are 
creatures of flesh and blood and therefore susceptible like all humankind to 
the deadly sins of greed and sloth.  Under republican theory, therefore, it is 
not enough for fiduciary law to prescribe legal rights and duties that affirm a 
universal right to freedom from domination in the abstract.  To secure liberty 
in a practical sense, the law must also furnish appropriate causes of action 
and effective remedies to protect beneficiaries against a fiduciary’s self-
dealing and waste.186  Legal sanctions that deter fiduciaries from abusing trust 
may be particularly valuable as checks against domination.  But perfect 
deterrence is not a prerequisite for republican liberty.  A legal system can 
secure freedom from domination even if it does not prevent all abuses from 
occurring ex ante, as long as it supplies robust accountability mechanisms to 
defuse domination ex post by guaranteeing that fiduciaries are unable to 
exercise arbitrary control with impunity.187 
Fiduciary duties emancipate principals by ensuring that their liberty is 
not compromised by fiduciary power.  Whenever the law entrusts a party with 
power over others’ legal or practical interests, the duty of loyalty prevents 
this power from being held in a manner that engenders domination.  A 
fiduciary does not dominate her principal if the law requires her to exercise 
entrusted power in a manner that tracks the principal’s “avowed or avowal-
ready interests,” to borrow Pettit’s formulation.188  A fiduciary must follow 
her principal’s “avowed interests,” as reflected in her express instructions, 
and she must act with reasonable diligence and prudence to achieve her 
principal’s “avowal-reading interests,” as reflected in her broader objectives 
and purposes.189  Focusing on a principal’s “avowed or avowal-ready 
interests” in this manner respects a principal’s independent agency by 
requiring that exercises of fiduciary power be interpretable always as 
empowering a principal to accomplish her own purposes.  The duty of loyalty 
thus safeguards a principal’s liberty by ensuring that she remains in a position 
of formal self-mastery with respect to her fiduciary’s exercise of entrusted 
power. 
 
186. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 254–68 (discussing judicial applications of fiduciary 
principles and theories for determining whether fiduciary duties should be recognized and enforced 
by the law). 
187. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 271 (characterizing impunity as 
“domination institutionalized”). 
188. Pettit, supra note 40, at 117. 
189. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 104 (noting that some view the core fiduciary duty as 
acting in the best interests of the beneficiary, under the tacit assumption that such interests may be 
either express or implicit). 
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Fiduciary duties also protect beneficiaries from domination.  Absent the 
duty of loyalty, a fiduciary would have the capacity to subject beneficiaries’ 
equitable interests to her own arbitrary control by exercising fiduciary power 
in a manner that was indifferent to these interests.  Beneficiaries would 
therefore interact with their fiduciaries from an unequal position of 
vulnerability and subservience.190  In appreciation of the fiduciary’s 
dominating power, beneficiaries would be forced to maintain constant 
vigilance against the threat of fiduciary misconduct.  They might feel the need 
to engage in self-abasement or self-censorship in order to remain within the 
trustee’s good graces.  Indeed, they might feel compelled to offer kickbacks 
or other material inducements as security against the risk of fiduciary self-
dealing.191  The duty of loyalty rescues beneficiaries from this position of 
abject vulnerability by arming them with legal claims that affirm their 
equitable interest in fiduciaries’ fidelity to the principal’s instructions and 
purposes. 
Modern fiduciary law also safeguards fiduciaries from domination, 
ensuring that the requirement to pursue others’ purposes and interests does 
not enslave fiduciaries to their principals and beneficiaries.  Most fiduciary 
relationships today are established through a voluntary undertaking, with 
fiduciaries receiving handsome remuneration for services performed.192  And 
fiduciaries are generally free to exit the relationship if they become 
dissatisfied with the terms under which they labor.193  Thus, while fiduciary 
law demands that fiduciaries exercise fiduciary power exclusively for other-
regarding purposes, it does not safeguard the liberty of principals and 
beneficiaries at the expense of fiduciaries’ equal freedom. 
Skeptics might object that the republican tradition’s focus on 
domination—the mere capacity for arbitrary interference—devotes too little 
attention to a fiduciary’s wrongful exercise of power and the material harm 
that may result from this exercise.  The republican theory developed in this 
Article recognizes, however, that domination is not the only threat to freedom 
that justifies legal regulation; a fiduciary also wrongs her principal and 
 
190. See, e.g., Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Morgan [1985] AC 686 (HL) 609 (Lord 
Scarman) (appeal taken from AC) (Eng.) (asserting that fiduciary relations arise where one party is 
subject to another’s dominating influence). 
191. See, e.g., Hylton v. Hylton (1754) 28 Eng. Rep. 349, 350; 2 Ves. Sen. 548, 548–49 
(suggesting that if courts did not apply the no-conflict rule, trust beneficiaries might feel compelled 
to offer kickbacks to secure a smooth transfer of the estate). 
192. See Talley, supra note 111, at 300 (observing that “no one is required to become a 
corporate fiduciary; she consents to do so voluntarily, and only then in exchange for compensation 
that makes entering such a relationship worthwhile”). 
193. A court-ordered constructive trust is an exception to this rule, but this relationship 
generally functions as a “restitutionary proprietary remedy” rather than a free-standing fiduciary 
relationship.  LAC Minerals Ltd. v. Int’l Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 577–80 
(Can.). 
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beneficiaries if she exercises entrusted power in a manner that is indifferent 
to their interests.  In previous writings, Evan Fox-Decent and I have described 
the arbitrary exercise of fiduciary power as “instrumentalization,” and we 
have argued that the Kantian principle of noninstrumentalization 
complements the principle of nondomination in specifying the normative 
requirements of a republican legal order.194  Both noninstrumentalization and 
nondomination are essential benchmarks for evaluating whether a legal 
system meets the normative requirements of a republican legal order.  By 
ruling out a fiduciary’s formal capacity for arbitrary control and providing 
remedies responsive to the actual exercise of arbitrary control, fiduciary law 
satisfies both the principle of nondomination and the principle of 
noninstrumentalization. 
Contrary to the classical liberal theory, however, fiduciary law’s formal 
structure is not devoted to protecting beneficiaries from material harm.  A 
fiduciary who treats entrusted power as a means to her own ends wrongs her 
beneficiaries even if her actions do not harm their interests—for example, 
when an investment manager purchases highly profitable investments for a 
client, but, in the process, also receives undisclosed kickbacks without the 
client’s consent.  Conversely, a fiduciary may harm her beneficiaries’ 
interests without committing any wrong—for example, when an investment 
manager selects prudent investments, but the investments unexpectedly lose 
value.  Consistent with the republican theory, the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
prohibits fiduciaries from subjecting entrusted power to their own alien 
control; it does not fully insure beneficiaries’ interests against harm. 
Republicanism thus clarifies the fiduciary relationship’s unique threat 
to liberty.  What distinguishes fiduciary relationships from ordinary arm’s-
length relationships is that a fiduciary receives power in “trust” (fides) for 
another.195  The power entrusted to a fiduciary is, by definition, not her own; 
rather, she receives entrusted power in an official capacity on the condition 
that she exercise the powers associated with her office in a manner that is 
consistent with her purposive mandate.  The fiduciary mandate circumscribes 
the outer limits of a fiduciary’s authority to hold and exercise entrusted 
power.  Accordingly, an agent who treats fiduciary power as a means to 
advance her own ends dominates her principal by arbitrarily displacing the 
principal’s decisions concerning how her own legal rights and powers will be 
exercised.  Similarly, a trustee who treats fiduciary power as a means to 
advance her own ends wrongs her beneficiaries by asserting alien control 
over their legal and practical interests.  This corruption of the fiduciary office 
 
194. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 78. 
195. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1, 28 (2006) (“The Latin root of fiduciary—’fides’—means ‘faith,’ as in trust, reliability, or 
faithfulness . . . .”). 
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constitutes a distinctive form of domination—the betrayal of trust—that 
justifies fiduciary law’s distinctive duty of loyalty with its associated 
remedies. 
The idea that “betrayal of trust” lies at the heart of fiduciary loyalty 
resonates with the familiar refrain in American jurisprudence that fiduciary 
relationships are distinguished by “trust and confidence.”196  All fiduciary 
relationships involve trust and confidence in the strictly formal, legal sense 
that fiduciaries exercise powers that are entrusted to exercise.  Parties to 
fiduciary relationships may also subjectively trust one another to meet their 
respective obligations,197 but “the fact that one person subjectively trusted 
another—is neither necessary for nor conclusive of the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship.”198  In determining whether or not a relationship is 
fiduciary, courts do not ask whether the parties actually trust one another in 
a subjective sense; instead, they simply ask whether a party has received 
power over another’s legal or practical interests in “trust and confidence”—
i.e., on the condition that the power be exercised exclusively for the other’s 
benefit.199  Within such relationships, the fiduciary duty of loyalty ensures 
that fiduciaries cannot expose their principal and beneficiaries to domination 
by subjecting entrusted power to their own alien control. 
Some scholars argue that the primary purpose of fiduciary law is to 
inculcate social norms, encouraging fiduciaries to practice loyalty and care 
out of a sense of moral obligation.200  The implicit corollary of this view is 
 
196. E.g., Advocare Int’l LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 695–96 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that the court below had instructed the jury that “a fiduciary duty may arise informally from 
a ‘relationship of trust and confidence’”); Amendola v. Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(observing that even in the absence of a formal fiduciary relationship, a constructive trust may be 
recognized by the court where a relationship of “trust and confidence” exists); see also Gerdes v. 
Estate of Cush, 953 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1992) (characterizing “the position of trust” as the 
fiduciary relationship’s distinguishing feature). 
197. See Harding, supra note 165, at 84–85 (emphasizing this feature of fiduciary 
relationships). 
198. Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, ¶ 69 (Austl.).  Parties to 
relational contracts often exercise trust in one another, yet a fiduciary relationship is not triggered 
unless one of the parties has conferred power on the other on the condition that the power be held 
and exercised exclusively for other-regarding purposes.  See id. (using the example of the 
contractor–subcontractor relationship to illustrate this point). 
199. See Evans v. Taco Bell Corp., 2005 WL 2333841, at *12 (D.N.H. Sept. 23, 2005) 
(explaining that “‘confidence’ in this context does not equate with simple reliance on another to 
perform a bargained-for service, but denotes a ‘special confidence reposed in one who . . . is bound 
to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence’” (quoting 
Lash v. Cheshire Cty. Sav. Bank, 474 A.2d 980, 982 (1984))). 
200. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1253, 1266 (1999) (noting that “[a]lthough the regulatory function of these legal rules is important, 
the social norm of loyalty that the legal rules support and define is critical to the efficient operation 
of the duty of loyalty”); Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, 
Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 857 (identifying fiduciary duties as “broad 
standards,” which are “all-encompassing” as moral obligations “pervasively to act loyally, in good 
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that fiduciary law could be discarded in a world where all fiduciaries could 
be trusted to refrain from opportunism.201  The republican theory challenges 
this view.  Fiduciary virtue might be desirable, but it is not strictly necessary 
to preserve freedom from domination.  As long as legal norms and 
institutions ensure that a fiduciary cannot engage in opportunism with 
impunity, a fiduciary’s motivations for loyal or disloyal behavior are legally 
and practically irrelevant.202  Nor is a fiduciary’s commitment to social norms 
sufficient to secure liberty.  The classic examples of the virtuous king and 
benevolent slave master illustrate that domination can be present even if a 
power holder’s intentions and actions are above reproach.203  Even if all 
fiduciaries were angels, fiduciary law would still be necessary as a formal 
matter to affirm that loyalty and care are legal obligations and not merely 
social conventions that depend for their fulfillment on a fiduciary’s unilateral 
discretion, personal morality, or good will. 
Republicanism thus offers a robust interpretive account of the normative 
basis for fiduciary loyalty.  Under the republican theory, the duty of loyalty 
is not merely a subset of contractual obligations or property rules, as some 
scholars have suggested.204  It is not a prophylactic requirement intended to 
promote the performance of non-fiduciary obligations.205  Nor is its primary 
purpose to lower transaction costs in private bargaining,206 provide a 
framework for optimal deterrence,207 or promote voluntary adherence to 
social norms.208  Instead, the requirements of fiduciary loyalty serve primarily 
 
faith, and with due care”); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate 
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (comparing Delaware courts’ opinions on 
fiduciary duties to sermons and parables which serve as a form of instruction to practitioners). 
201. See Eisenberg, supra note 200, at 1274 (“[I]f all corporate actors fully internalized the 
social norm of loyalty and gave full effect to that norm, the costs of both legal sanctions and 
monitoring and bonding systems would be unnecessary . . . .”). 
202. See SELLERS, supra note 39, at 67 (noting John Adams’s observation that in a republican 
system liberty may flourish “even among highwaymen”). 
203. See Pettit, supra note 43, at 44 (“From the earliest Roman days, the republican tradition 
insisted that being under the power of a master—in potestate domini—meant being un-free, even if 
that master was quite benevolent and allowed you a great deal of leeway.”). 
204. See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman, On Trust and Transubstantiation: Mitigating the Excesses of 
Ownership, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 339 (discussing the duty of loyalty 
as arising out of property rules); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 426 (arguing that fiduciary 
loyalty is a subset of contract obligations); Langbein, supra note 7, at 657–59 (contending that 
fiduciary loyalty is fundamentally contractarian); cf. Smith, supra note 63, at 1402 (asserting that 
fiduciary loyalty is based on the respect of a “critical resource belonging to the beneficiary”). 
205. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 4 (articulating a theory that fiduciary duties are “designed 
to assist with ensuring proper performance of non-fiduciary duties”). 
206. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 26, at 28–30 (describing how fiduciary obligations 
reduce the need for contracting parties to negotiate over remote contingencies). 
207. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1052 (analyzing deterrence problems in the 
context of fiduciary obligations). 
208. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 200, at 1016 (describing fiduciary duties as standards meant to 
influence the social behavior of directors, officers, and lawyers). 
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to emancipate private parties by defining and regulating fiduciary power in a 
manner that formally precludes domination from corrupting the fiduciary 
relationship. 
B. Identifying Fiduciary Relationships 
Private law theorists have struggled in the past to devise principled 
criteria for distinguishing fiduciary relationships from non-fiduciary 
relationships.209  Courts have held that certain categories of private 
relationships always trigger fiduciary duties, including agent–principal, 
trustee–beneficiary, guardian–ward, director/officer–corporation, attorney–
client, and doctor–patient.210  Other categories of private relationships, such 
as employer–employee, are sometimes held to trigger fiduciary duties, but 
sometimes not, depending upon case-specific features of the relationships 
between specific parties.211  Legislatures and courts have not always been 
clear and consistent, however, in their efforts to explain which relationships 
qualify as “fiduciary.”  As a result, fiduciary law’s borders remain 
theoretically and doctrinally nebulous. 
In recent years, legal scholars have proposed a variety of tests for 
distinguishing fiduciary relationships from non-fiduciary relationships.  
Some have argued that fiduciary duties are a product of contractual 
agreement or voluntary undertaking.212  As discussed previously, however, 
the voluntarist theory struggles to account for fiduciary relationships that 
arise without parties’ express or implied consent.  Rather than consider the 
parties’ actual intentions, courts tend to ascribe fiduciary duties to specific 
relationships based on whether one of the parties has reposed special “trust 
and confidence” in the other.213  Where this feature is present, courts 
commonly hold that the duty of loyalty applies even if the party who holds 
entrusted power persistently rejects the implication that she bears fiduciary 
 
209. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 923–24 (concluding that fiduciary relationships lack a common theoretical 
basis).  See generally Miller, supra note 2 (reviewing theories based on contract, property, and 
vulnerability, and offering a legal-formalist alternative). 
210. See DeMott, supra note 164, at 1258 (observing that “fiduciary-duty analysis usually 
proceeds categorically”). 
211. See id. (explaining that assessments of ad hoc fiduciary status in the employment context 
depend “on fact-specific inquiries”); Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 
104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (analyzing employer fiduciary duties based on the specific facts 
of an employment relationship). 
212. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 427 (concluding that a fiduciary relationship 
“is a contractual one”); James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 L.Q. REV. 302, 
310–13 (2010) (arguing that voluntary undertaking is a necessary condition for fiduciary 
obligation); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 7, at 447–49 (arguing that fiduciary duties are default 
contractual rules). 
213. See sources cited supra note 196. 
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duties.214  While classical liberals might welcome a rule that would make 
consent a prerequisite for the assumption of fiduciary duties, this approach 
has not gained traction in the courts. 
Another theory of the fiduciary relationship, advanced most forcefully 
by Paul Miller, posits that fiduciary relationships share a distinctive juridical 
structure.215  In Miller’s view, what makes fiduciary relationships special is 
the fiduciary’s discretionary power over another party’s legally protected 
rights.216  Because the legal rights that a fiduciary exercises belong to the 
beneficiary rather than fiduciary, “[t]he fiduciary may not treat fiduciary 
power as an unclaimed means or as a personal means.”217  Instead, the 
fiduciary must treat her beneficiary always as entitled to all benefits 
generated by her exercise of the entrusted power. 
Miller’s juridical theory offers a powerful framework for identifying 
some fiduciary relationships, but it struggles to make sense of other 
relationships that are universally accepted as fiduciary.  As Miller’s theory 
predicts, many fiduciaries do hold discretionary power to exercise another’s 
legal rights, including trustees, corporate officers, guardians, and investment 
managers.218  In these relationships, it is certainly plausible to think that the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty reflects the principle that beneficiaries are legally 
entitled to the full fruits of any exercise of their own rights.  Returning to 
examples discussed previously, however, it is hard to make the case that an 
arbitrator exercises the parties’ respective legal rights when she renders a 
judgment or that an investment manager exercises investors’ legal rights 
when she winds up a pooled fund, although in both contexts the fiduciary’s 
actions may limit her beneficiaries’ subsequent choices in ways that impact 
their legal interests.219  Equally problematic for Miller’s theory, courts have 
also held that advisers may qualify as fiduciaries even if they lack formal 
 
214. See SHEPHERD, supra note 165, at 66 (observing that when “fiduciary duties are attached 
by operation of law,” they apply even “in the face of express rejection of those very same duties by 
the fiduciary”). 
215. See Miller, supra note 163, at 69–75. 
216. Miller uses the term “[p]ersonal legal capacity” rather than rights, but the message is 
essentially the same.  Id. at 71. 
217. Miller, supra note 2, at 1021. 
218. See Miller, supra note 163, at 71 (observing that fiduciaries may be entrusted with power, 
inter alia, to “enter into legally binding relationships for another . . . ; acquire, invest, use, 
administer, or alienate property owned by or held for another; . . . to make decisions relating to the 
health and personal welfare of another; [and] to institute legal proceedings to enforce or seek 
vindication of legal rights for another”). 
219. Miller might respond that a fiduciary in these contexts wields rights that beneficiaries 
possess collectively, even though they cannot claim these rights individually.  But this response 
begs the question: why can groups of beneficiaries claim rights that their members do not possess 
individually? 
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authority to exercise their advisees’ legal rights.220  Thus, while Miller may 
be correct that a person is a fiduciary if she has discretionary power to 
exercise another’s legal rights, it does not necessarily follow that a person 
must hold such authority to qualify as a fiduciary. 
Some other scholars and judges have argued that what distinguishes 
fiduciary relationships from other relationships is a fiduciary’s discretionary 
power over beneficiaries’ interests, a power which renders beneficiaries 
uniquely vulnerable to opportunism.221  This emphasis on power, 
vulnerability, and opportunism resonates with fiduciary law’s historical roots 
in equity.222  The trouble with basing fiduciary duties on such vague concepts 
as power, vulnerability, and the threat of opportunism, however, is that these 
factors are present in all private relationships.  Hence, some further limiting 
principle is needed to prevent the fiduciary concept from swallowing all of 
private law.  To fill this void, we need a theory of the fiduciary relationship 
that is capable of justifying fiduciary duties without imposing these duties 
indiscriminately as a one-size-fits-all solution to every threat of opportunism 
that arises in the private sphere. 
The republican theory advanced in this Article furnishes a simple 
definition of the fiduciary relationship that is distinct from the contractarian, 
legal-formalist, and generic-opportunism accounts.  Under the republican 
theory, a party is a fiduciary if she has been entrusted with power over 
another party’s legal or practical interests.  For the sake of clarity, it may be 
helpful to break this definition down into its various component parts to allow 
for closer inspection. 
1. Entrustment.—A defining feature of any fiduciary relationship is 
entrusted power.223  Power is “entrusted” if it does not belong to a party by 
right but is nonetheless committed to her administration.  Power may be 
entrusted to a fiduciary by a voluntary assignment from a principal (e.g., 
attorney), by judicial appointment (e.g., receivership), or by the independent 
operation of law (e.g., agent of necessity).  The power may belong by right 
 
220. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963) 
(finding a fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and clients). 
221. See, e.g., Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 102 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (asserting 
that indicia of a fiduciary relationship include: “(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some 
discretion or power.  (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to 
affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.  (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to 
or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.”); DeMott, supra note 164, at 1259 
(“Fiduciary relationships stem from or create disparities of power and information, such that the 
relationship’s beneficiary is or becomes vulnerable to the [fiduciary].”). 
222. See, e.g., Flannigan, supra note 26, at 393 (“The conventional function of fiduciary 
regulation is to control opportunism in limited access arrangements.  That function has never been 
disputed.”); Smith, supra note 22, at 261 (“Equity as anti-opportunism explains not only the general 
tenor, but the overall structure and particular features of fiduciary law.”). 
223. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 4–5 (emphasizing entrustment as a distinguishing feature 
of fiduciary relationships). 
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to the principal (e.g., agency) or to a beneficiary (e.g., guardianship), or it 
may be called into existence by the independent operation of law (e.g., 
arbitration).  Regardless of the mechanism that triggers the entrustment of 
fiduciary power, the critical feature of entrusted power is held in trust; it is 
not committed to the unilateral discretion of the one who holds it.  
Entrustment is a necessary feature of fiduciary relationships under the 
republican theory because it facilitates the distinctive form of domination that 
fiduciary loyalty is designed to neutralize: a party’s capacity to betray trust 
by exercising alien control over entrusted power. 
2. Power.—Fiduciary power is a form of authority.  It may be de jure 
or de facto.  A fiduciary holds de jure power if her mandate authorizes her to 
exercise another’s legal rights or powers (e.g., agency) or other powers 
conferred by law (e.g., arbitration).  A fiduciary holds de facto power if she 
is in a position, as a practical matter, to dictate how another’s legal rights or 
powers will be exercised (e.g., investment adviser).  Fiduciary power may be 
limited to purely nondiscretionary ministerial tasks, or it may entail 
authorization to make discretionary judgments.  As this Article will explain 
further below, bringing nondiscretionary power within the ambit of fiduciary 
loyalty is important under the republican theory because fiduciary law’s 
distinctive remedies are necessary to remedy the domination entailed in a 
fiduciary’s infidelity to a nondiscretionary mandate.224 
3. Over Another Party’s Legal or Practical Interests.—A relationship 
is fiduciary only if a person holds power relative to another person’s legal or 
practical interests.  Under the republican theory, it is a fiduciary’s empowered 
position relative to her principal and beneficiaries that raises the threat of 
alien control.225  A fiduciary’s power to set aside the choices of her principal 
and disregard the legal and practical interests of her beneficiaries would 
constitute domination, but for fiduciary law’s emancipating intervention.226 
4. Some Applications.—The republican theory’s definition of the 
fiduciary relationship elucidates the scope of fiduciary law’s domain in a 
variety of respects. 
 
224. See infra section III(C)(2). 
225. Frankel asserts: 
The [fiduciary] relation may expose the entrustor to risk even if he is sophisticated, 
informed, and able to bargain effectively.  Rather, the entrustor’s vulnerability stems 
from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation.  The delegated power that 
enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the entrustor, 
because the purpose for which the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated power is 
narrower than the purposes for which he is capable of using that power. 
Frankel, supra note 32, at 810. 
226. See Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Morgan [1985] AC 686 (HL) 709 (Lord Scarman) 
(appeal taken from AC) (Eng.) (asserting that fiduciary relations arise where one party is subject to 
another’s dominating influence). 
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The republican theory confirms the conventional wisdom that some 
categories of private relationships always satisfy the republican theory’s 
criteria.  For example, all trustees are entrusted with power over others’ legal 
or practical interests.  Although some trustees hold more discretionary power 
than others, all bear a fiduciary duty of loyalty because the office of trustee, 
by definition, involves the entrustment of power over others’ legal or 
practical interests.227  Other fiduciary relationships that always satisfy these 
criteria include agent–principal, officer/director–corporation, partner–
partner, guardian–ward, and attorney–client.228  Because these relationships 
always meet the republican theory’s criteria, they are suitable for categorical 
treatment as “status-based fiduciary relationships” under the republican 
theory.229 
The republican theory also explains why generations of republican 
judges, politicians, and political theorists have confidently asserted that 
public officials and institutions are fiduciaries.230  Like fiduciaries under 
private law, public officials and institutions are entrusted with power over the 
legal and practical interests of their people.231  Consequently, they bear 
fiduciary obligations to exercise their entrusted power in a manner that 
satisfies the requirements of fiduciary loyalty. 
In addition, the republican theory supports recognizing investment 
advisers as fiduciaries for their clients.  Formally speaking, many investment 
advisers are not legally authorized to choose investments for their clients.232  
Nonetheless, courts have held that investment advisers are fiduciaries 
because they hold themselves out to their clients as experts who will act in 
clients’ best interests, thereby inducing their clients to entrust them with 
responsibility to assist them in an official advisory capacity.233  This line of 
cases is difficult to square with theories of the fiduciary relationship that 
focus exclusively on a fiduciary’s exercise of de jure authority,234 but they 
 
227. See Trustee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “trustee” as 
“[s]omeone who stands in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another; esp., one who, having legal 
title to property, holds it in trust for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that 
beneficiary”). 
228. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 331, 349 (2009) (listing and detailing different types of fiduciary relationships). 
229. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 241–42 (2011). 
230. See sources cited supra notes 15–16. 
231. See generally CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14 (covering the fiduciary duty of 
public officials under international law); FOX-DECENT, supra note 17. 
232. Arthur B. Laby, Advisers as Fiduciaries 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
233. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–94 (1963) 
(describing the fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and clients and confirming 
Congress’s designation of investment advisers as fiduciaries). 
234. See, e.g., Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 386 (Can.) (Sopinka, McLachlin & 
Major, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that an investment adviser is not a fiduciary because the advisee formally 
“retains the power and ability to make his or her own decisions”). 
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harmonize easily with the republican theory’s insight that fiduciary law is 
equally concerned with domination that arises in relationships involving de 
facto power.  Although an investment adviser’s client retains formal control 
over her investment decisions, the investment adviser receives entrusted de 
facto power to guide and shape those decisions.235  Under the republican 
theory, therefore, the investment adviser–advisee relationship triggers 
fiduciary obligations to provide “disinterested” advice and receive informed 
consent to any conflicted transactions.236 
The republican theory thus explains why the current arguments for 
setting aside DOL’s Fiduciary Rule are unpersuasive.237  Under the 
republican theory, fiduciary duties apply to retirement-investment advisers 
not for the purpose of achieving optimal deterrence of harm (as reflected in 
a conventional cost–benefit analysis)238 but rather to neutralize the 
domination that would arise if investment advisers had the capacity to wield 
alien control over their clients’ legal and practical interests.  Fiduciary law’s 
traditional no-conflict and no-profit rules are strictly necessary, under 
republican legal theory, to prevent domination from corrupting adviser 
relationships that are premised on trust and confidence.239 
Some fiduciaries exercise a combination of de jure and de facto power 
over their beneficiaries’ interests.  For example, when a patient authorizes a 
surgeon to operate on her body, making discretionary decisions as the 
operation unfolds, the surgeon exercises de jure power entrusted by the 
patient herself.  The surgeon therefore assumes fiduciary obligations to honor 
the patient’s instructions and purposes, act with solicitude toward the 
patient’s avowed or avowal-ready interests, and exercise the care and skill 
expected of members of her profession.  Even before surgery begins, 
however, the surgeon is a fiduciary for her patient when she provides advice 
on possible treatment options.  Although the surgeon–adviser does not wield 
formal control over her patient’s choices, the structure of the advisement 
relationship is one in which the patient entrusts the surgeon with de facto 
 
235. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining a fiduciary 
relationship arises when “one person has reposed trust and confidence in another who thereby gains 
influence and superiority over the other,” and that such a relationship is seen when “the agent has . . . 
expert knowledge the deployment of which the principal cannot monitor” (quoting Amendola v. 
Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
236. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 188–92. 
237. See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. 
238. This is not to say, however, that the Fiduciary Rule cannot survive cost–benefit analysis.  
See Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, No. 16-cv-1476, 2017 WL514424, at *32–35 (N.D. Tex. 
Feb. 8, 2017) (concluding that DOL’s assessment of the Fiduciary Rule’s costs and benefits was 
reasonable); Fiduciary Rule, supra note 148, at 20,949–52, 20,952 tbl.1 (explaining how the 
Fiduciary Rule “will mitigate conflicts, support consumer choice, and deliver substantial gains for 
retirement investors and economic benefits that more than justify its costs”). 
239. The Fiduciary Rule exempts investment advice that is merely incidental to certain arm’s-
length transactions.  Fiduciary Rule, supra note 148, at 20,948. 
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power to shape and constrain her choices regarding her own medical care.  
The surgeon is a fiduciary for her patient, therefore, regardless of the fact that 
the patient retains both the formal right and the practical capacity to reject 
her advice.  Focusing on the threat of arbitrary control in this manner explains 
not only when and how fiduciary duties apply to physicians but also to other 
relationships such as attorney–client that combine de jure powers with the 
provision of professional advice. 
An increasingly important type of de facto power that may generate 
fiduciary duties is access to confidential information.240  Private parties often 
entrust confidential information to a fiduciary within the context of a broader 
fiduciary relationship—for example, when a criminal defendant shares 
inculpatory information with her defense attorney or a patient allows a 
physician to collect sensitive data concerning her physical or emotional 
health.  When attorneys, physicians, counselors, and clerics accept 
confidential information, they are entrusted with de facto power over the 
practical interests of the party who shares the information, with the 
expectation that they will use the information exclusively for the benefit of 
the sharing party.241  As such, these relationships of trust and confidence 
activate the fiduciary duty of loyalty, requiring the recipient to use 
confidential information solely to advance her beneficiaries’ avowed or 
avowal-ready interests.242  Conversely, when parties share confidential 
information in contexts that do not involve the expectation that the recipient 
will use the information to promote the other’s best interests (e.g., sharing 
confidential business data during arm’s-length merger negotiations), 
fiduciary duties do not apply.243 
Fiduciary relationships formed solely by the entrustment of power over 
confidential information are an example of what courts and commentators 
 
240. See Brooks, supra note 26, at 239–40 (describing “information fiduciaries” as having both 
an affirmative duty to collect and use personal information as well as a duty to observe 
confidentiality standards).  See generally Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, Information Fiduciaries and the 
First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (discussing the tension between “personal 
privacy in the digital age” and companies’ interest in collecting, analyzing, and distributing 
customers’ personal information). 
241. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 209, at 882 (“[A] fiduciary’s duties go beyond mere fairness 
and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary’s best interests.”); Smith, supra note 
63, at 1402, 1441 (explaining that “fiduciary relationships form when one party . . . acts on behalf 
of another party . . . with respect to a critical resource belonging to the [second party],” for example, 
confidential information in doctor–patient, attorney–client, and clergy–parishioner relationships). 
242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 49, 60 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (discussing lawyers’ fiduciary duties to keep confidences); MARK A. HALL ET AL., 
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 169–97 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the duty 
of patient confidentiality). 
243. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 n.22 (1983) (citing with approval Walton v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 798–99 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the possession of 
confidential information within the context of an arm’s-length merger negotiation is not sufficient 
to generate a fiduciary relationship and that liability would not attach in the event of its disclosure)). 
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have sometimes described as “ad hoc”244 or “informal”245 fiduciary 
relationships.  Ad hoc fiduciary relationships arise when a particular 
relationship does not fall within a status-based category of fiduciary 
relationships (e.g., agency, trust) but nonetheless qualifies for the duty of 
loyalty based on features specific to the relationship.246  The republican 
theory suggests that courts should identify ad hoc fiduciary relationships by 
asking a simple question: does a party hold entrusted power over another’s 
legal or practical interests? 
This test confirms current jurisprudence in a variety of respects.  
Consistent with established case law, the republican theory affirms that used 
car dealers are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their customers,247 cigarette 
manufacturers are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their consumers,248 and 
restauranteurs are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their patrons.249  Although 
each of these relationships involves significant information asymmetries, 
generating a risk of opportunism, the relationships are all presumptively 
arm’s-length; none by definition involves an entrustment of power from one 
party to another to be exercised under a purposive and other-regarding 
mandate.250  Consequently, these relationships do not ordinarily render either 
party vulnerable to the specific type of opportunism that triggers fiduciary 
duties and remedies.  The injuries that arise within these relationships can be 
remedied, instead, through other regimes such as contract law, tort law, 
property law, and criminal law.251 
 
244. E.g., Galambos v. Perez, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247, 276 (Can.); DeMott, supra note 164, at 
1261. 
245. E.g., Advocare Int’l, LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 695 (5th Cir. 2008). 
246. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[F]iduciary duties are 
sometimes imposed on an ad hoc basis . . . [when] a person solicits another to trust him in matters 
in which he represents himself to be expert as well as trustworthy and the other is not expert and 
accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in him . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
247. Cf. Guenther v. Snap-On Tools Corp., No. 90 C 4436, 1995 WL 137061, at *2–4, *9 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 28, 1995) (“While the law recognizes certain relationships . . . as being fiduciary, the 
relationship between franchisor and franchisee is not among them.”), vacated in part by 1996 WL 
84182 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1996). 
248. See Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906, 911–13 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that “ordinary transactions for the sale of cigarettes do not, as a matter of Kansas law, 
create fiduciary relationships”). 
249. See Evans v. Taco Bell Corp., No. Civ. 04CV103JD, 2005 WL 2333841, at *13 (D.N.H. 
Sept. 23, 2005) (concluding it is “obvious” that no fiduciary relationship exists between fast-food 
restaurants and their customers). 
250. See, e.g., Carey Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Elgin, 392 N.E.2d 759, 763 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (“Normal trust between friends or businesses, plus a slightly dominant business 
position, do not operate to turn a formal, contractual relationship into a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship.”). 
251. See, e.g., Engle v. Ligett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1276–77 (Fla. 2006) (denying class 
certification to a large group of tobacco plaintiffs, but allowing the individual plaintiffs to proceed 
with suit based on injuries resulting from the use of tobacco products); Taco Bell Corp., 2005 WL 
2333841, at *5–12 (discussing the application of negligence and strict liability causes of action to 
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Harder cases for the republican theory include mechanic–client and 
contractor–homeowner—i.e., relationships in which a property owner 
commits their property to another’s care with the expectation that the latter 
will improve the property for the owner’s benefit.  Courts have concluded 
that auto mechanics and home contractors are not ordinarily fiduciaries for 
their clients because their services “occasion no fiduciary-like trust or 
equivalent reposing of faith.”252  Some commentators have questioned the 
accuracy and coherency of this conclusion, arguing that clients do, in fact, 
entrust auto mechanics and home contractors with de jure and de facto power 
over their property interests, much as patients entrust physicians with de jure 
and de facto power over their bodies.253  Although this Article does not afford 
the space necessary to resolve this debate definitively, the republican theory 
suggests that auto mechanics and home contractors qualify as fiduciaries only 
if these relationships are conditioned, in actual practice, on the understanding 
that the service providers receive authority in trust for their clients’ exclusive 
benefit.  If property owners do not “entrust” their property to mechanics and 
contractors in this robust sense, the fiduciary duty of loyalty does not apply. 
C. The Requirements of Fiduciary Loyalty 
Fiduciary relationships trigger a number of legal duties, including the 
duty of care, the duty to keep and render accounts, and the duty to furnish 
critical information,254 but the heart of fiduciary law is its distinctive duty of 
loyalty.  Despite its centrality to the theory and practice of fiduciary law, the 
concept of fiduciary “loyalty” remains ambiguous and contested.  As Andrew 
Gold has demonstrated, courts have employed a variety of different 
conceptions of fiduciary loyalty, including honoring a hypothetical bargain, 
fidelity to the instructions and purposes, affirmative devotion to 
 
injuries the plaintiff allegedly suffered from consuming food prepared by a Taco Bell employee 
with Hepatitis A); United States v. Sullivan, 498 F.2d 146, 149–50 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding the 
embezzlement conviction of a union employee who “possessed [a] fiduciary obligation with respect 
to union funds and assets”); Karl A. Boedecker & Fred W. Morgan, Strict Liability for Sellers of 
Used Products: A Conceptual Rationale and Current Status, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 178, 
179–84 (1993) (reviewing cases involving strict liability claims for sales of used cars and discussing 
the rationales behind the holdings). 
252. Thompson v. Wis. Cty. Mut. Ins. Corp., No. 95-3107-FT, 1996 WL 330363, at *1 (Wis. 
Ct. App. June 18, 1996) (per curiam); see also Guenther, 1995 WL 137061, at *9 (rejecting the idea 
in dicta that “disparity of knowledge . . . would make an auto mechanic or home-repair contractor 
the fiduciary of his less knowledgeable customer”).  But see Council on Am.-Islamic Relations 
Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 31 F. Supp. 3d 237, 257–61 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that if an 
individual obtained an internship with an organization in order to take compromising video of the 
organization, the individual would owe a fiduciary duty of confidentiality if he “understood himself 
to be bound by and violating a duty of confidentiality and non-disclosure”). 
253. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 227–28. 
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76–84 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (enumerating 
and discussing the specific duties owed by a trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust). 
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beneficiaries’ interests, fairness and evenhandedness, and the avoidance of 
conflicts.255  Taking into account the many fields where the duty of loyalty 
applies and the powerful remedies available for its breach, it is no great 
exaggeration to suggest that clarifying the requirements of fiduciary loyalty 
ranks among the most important challenges for private law theory today. 
The republican theory of fiduciary law offers new tools for addressing 
this challenge.  By grounding fiduciary loyalty in freedom from domination, 
the republican theory helps to explain and justify the duty of loyalty’s 
traditional requirements of fidelity to instructions and purposes, affirmative 
devotion to beneficiaries’ interests, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and fair 
and evenhanded treatment of beneficiaries.256  The republican theory thus 
supports the conventional American view that the duty of loyalty has both 
proscriptive and prescriptive dimensions,257 and it calls into question recent 
efforts to dismantle the categorical no-conflict and no-profit rules in favor of 
flexible presumptions and standards that reflect the normative commitments 
of classical liberalism. 
1. Fidelity to Instructions and Purposes.—Consider first the suggestion 
that the duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to “be true” to her principal’s 
instructions and purposes.258  According to the republican theory, a fiduciary 
may exercise entrusted power only in a manner that is consistent with the 
instructions and purposes enshrined in her official mandate.259  To safeguard 
principals and beneficiaries from domination, the fiduciary must respect 
instructions and purposes that communicate the principal’s avowed and 
avowal-ready interests.260  Hence, a fiduciary’s acceptance, assertion, or 
exercise of entrusted power over another’s legal or practical interests 
automatically triggers a legal requirement to be true to the terms of the trust 
reposed. 
The republican theory rejects the popular view that the duty of loyalty 
does not apply in the absence of discretion.261  Under the republican theory, 
 
255. Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, 
supra note 6, at 176, 178–83. 
256. As Lionel Smith has explained, the “duty of loyalty” is best understood as a legal 
requirement that applies to the exercise of fiduciary power—rather than, strictly speaking, a legal 
duty.  Smith, supra note 124, at 142. 
257. In contrast, Australian courts have held that fiduciary duties are exclusively proscriptive.  
Pilmer v Duke Grp. Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR ¶ 74 (Austl.); Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 113 
(Austl.). 
258. Gold, supra note 255, at 180–82. 
259. See, e.g., US Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Thompson, Civ. A. No. 91-2089-O, 1992 WL 
350233, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 1992) (holding that an agent “violated his fiduciary duty to follow 
explicit instructions” by entering unauthorized transactions). 
260. See Harding, supra note 165, at 93–95 (arguing that the no-conflict rule rests on “the 
requirements of respect . . . [which] forbid using other people as means to one’s own ends”). 
261. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 163, at 72 (“[P]owers are ordinarily considered fiduciary only 
if they are discretionary.”); DeMott, supra note 209, at 901 (“If the relationship . . . does not confer 
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a person is a fiduciary if she holds entrusted power over another’s legal or 
practical interests, even if that entrusted power does not involve discretionary 
judgment.262  For example, an agent who is given a purely ministerial charge 
to deposit money in her principal’s bank account is entrusted with de jure 
power to act on her behalf.  If the agent instead absconds with the money and 
invests it for her own profit, she breaches her fiduciary duty of loyalty.263  
The agent is liable not only for breach of contract and conversion of her 
principal’s property but also for breach of the duty of loyalty.  Accordingly, 
a court may order rescission of the agent’s transactions, or it may order the 
agent to hold the purchased investments in constructive trust and disgorge 
any profits she accrued through her self-dealing pursuant to fiduciary law’s 
no-profit rule.264  While contract law and property law are capable of 
redressing the harm caused by the agent’s wrongful interference with her 
principal’s choices, only fiduciary law is designed to redress the breach of 
trust entailed in the fiduciary’s opportunistic instrumentalization of her 
entrusted power.265  Thus, the duty of loyalty applies regardless of whether a 
fiduciary exercises discretionary or nondiscretionary power. 
2. Affirmative Devotion to Beneficiaries’ Interests.—The republican 
theory also supports a requirement that fiduciaries pursue the best interests 
of their beneficiaries with affirmative devotion.266  Fiduciary relationships 
are distinct from ordinary contractual relationships, as Daniel Markovits has 
explained, because a contract promisor is required only to “honor her 
contract,” while a “fiduciary must take the initiative on her beneficiary’s 
behalf” and “make new sacrifices in the face of unforeseen developments.”267  
 
discretion on the ‘fiduciary,’ then his actions are not subject to the fiduciary constraint.”); Weinrib, 
supra note 164, at 4 (asserting that “the fiduciary must have scope for the exercise of discretion”).  
But see Arthur B. Laby, Book Review, 35 L. & PHIL. 123, 130–34 (2016) (reviewing 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6) (criticizing the “discretionary power” theory of 
fiduciary relationships). 
262. See Laby, supra note 261, at 132 (arguing that there are “many instances when courts 
impose fiduciary duties on persons and firms shorn of discretionary power over another,” such as 
investment advisers, lawyers, and physicians who are acting in an advisory capacity). 
263. See IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1421–22 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing 
that nondiscretionary “control over assets” is sufficient to trigger fiduciary duties under ERISA); 
McDermott v. Party City Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 612, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (explaining that “an agent 
who embezzles from his principal may be in breach of . . . the [fiduciary] duty imposed by operation 
of law”). 
264. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. b, 
illustr. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (observing that such remedies are available in a similar scenario 
where embezzled funds are used to purchase real property). 
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 93, 100 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (defining 
breach of trust and trustee liability for such a breach). 
266. Evan Fox-Decent and I refer to this requirement elsewhere as the principle of “solicitude.”  
See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 98 (describing the principle of solicitude as concern 
for the other’s “legitimate interests”). 
267. Markovits, supra note 6, at 216, 222. 
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The duty of loyalty thus requires a fiduciary to tailor her actions to advance 
her beneficiaries’ best interests. 
A number of courts have asserted that the requirement of affirmative 
devotion requires alignment between a fiduciary’s intentions and her 
beneficiaries’ interests.268  In Stone v. Ritter,269 for example, the Delaware 
Supreme Court famously took the position that a corporate “director cannot 
act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief 
that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”270  Fiduciary loyalty 
therefore demands that a fiduciary exercise entrusted power in a manner that 
she believes will promote the best interests of her beneficiaries.271 
Purely as a matter of interpersonal ethics, the logic of Stone v. Ritter is 
unassailable: a fiduciary does not act loyally if she does not believe her 
actions advance her beneficiaries’ best interests.  But should affirmative 
devotion be enshrined as a legal obligation?  The republican theory suggests 
that the answer is “yes.”  This conclusion may not seem particularly 
surprising, given the emphasis that republicans place on the importance of 
cultivating civic virtue.272  But the reasons why affirmative devotion is a legal 
requirement require further elaboration. 
Under the republican theory, the legal requirement of affirmative 
devotion is not concerned with elevating a fiduciary’s moral rectitude for its 
own sake, nor is it merely a means for reducing the likelihood of harm to 
beneficiaries’ interests.  Fiduciaries are required to give due regard to their 
beneficiaries’ interests because this approach safeguards beneficiaries’ 
freedom from domination.273  A fiduciary who reserved the right to exercise 
entrusted power based on reasons unrelated to her mandate and the interests 
of her beneficiaries would subject the interests of her principal and 
 
268. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (explaining that the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty encompasses an obligation to act in good faith, which requires a fiduciary to act “in the 
good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest”); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (“The good faith required of a . . . fiduciary includes 
not simply the duties of care and loyalty . . . but all actions required by a true faithfulness and 
devotion to the interests of the [beneficiary].”). 
269. 911 A.2d at 362. 
270. Id. at 370 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
271. Smith, supra note 124, at 148. 
272. See, e.g., Besson & Martí, supra note 36, at 22–24 (extolling civic virtues such as “respect 
for and loyalty to the law [and] the republic’s institutions, . . . respect for pluralism and for others’ 
preferences and opinions[,]” and the pursuit of “the common good . . . through political 
participation” as necessary to enable and promote the political participation of an active and 
motivated citizenry required by republican liberty).  See generally PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST 
DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT, VIRTUE, AND RESPECT (2015) (developing 
these themes). 
273. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Keeping the Promise of Public Fiduciary Theory: 
A Reply to Leib and Galoob, 126 YALE L.J. F. 192, 199 (2016) (“[F]iduciary rules and remedies in 
the United States . . . reflect the republican principle of non-domination.”). 
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beneficiaries to alien control.274  The republican theory thus supports the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s view that a fiduciary’s affirmative devotion to 
her beneficiaries’ best interests is an indispensable requirement of fiduciary 
loyalty. 
Contrary to the views of some fiduciary scholars, however, the duty of 
loyalty does not require that a fiduciary’s motives for action be wholly 
uncompromised by self-regarding interests.275  Recall that the purpose of 
private law, under the republican theory, is to ensure that a private party’s 
legal and practical interests are not subject to another’s arbitrary control.  The 
loyalty requirement of affirmative devotion safeguards freedom from 
domination, in part, by obligating a fiduciary to act in a manner that she 
reasonably believes in good faith will maximize her beneficiaries’ interests.  
When a fiduciary satisfies this requirement, her solicitude to the interests of 
her beneficiaries ensures that she does not exercise alien control.  From the 
beneficiaries’ perspective, it does not matter whether the fiduciary’s primary 
motivation for acting loyally is a desire for remuneration, fear of legal 
sanctions, or other self-regarding considerations.276  As long as the fiduciary 
exercises her entrusted authority in a manner that she reasonably believes will 
advance her principal’s directives and her beneficiaries’ best interests, the 
principal and beneficiaries cannot complain that they are subject to 
domination.277  From the perspective of republican legal theory, therefore, 
 
274. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 993 (asserting that a breach of fiduciary duty may be 
conceptualized as a harmful interference with the beneficiary’s personal interests). 
275. But see Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY 
AND TRUSTS 53, 69 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003) (“The fiduciary obligation of loyalty requires the 
fiduciary to act with a particular motive: in general, she must act (or not act) in what she perceives 
to be the best interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.”); Leib & Galoob, supra note 17, at 
1835–38 (asserting a conscientious- motivation requirement such that “certain ways of conforming 
to fiduciary duties do not count as living up to fiduciary norms” if not based in the best interests of 
the principal). Smith, in particular, argues that the no-conflict and no-profit rules are necessary to 
compensate for courts’ inability to surmount the inscrutability of a fiduciary’s true motivations.  See 
Smith, supra, at 74 (“The prophylactic rules are triggered by situations in which it may be especially 
difficult to know with what motive the fiduciary acted, because the fiduciary is subject to conflicting 
motivational pressures.”). 
276. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 273, at 203 (“As long as a fiduciary performs her 
entrusted duties with due regard for her principal’s instructions and her beneficiaries’ best interests, 
the law does not care [what] the reasons motivating her actions are. . . .  As long as the . . . fiduciary 
does not assert the prerogative to wield entrusted power in a manner that is indifferent to her 
beneficiaries’ interests, she does not subject her beneficiary to instrumentalization or domination.”).  
This is not to suggest, of course, that a fiduciary’s motivations are unimportant from the perspective 
of republican ethics.  See PETTIT, supra note 272, 44–48 (arguing that republican virtues impose 
robust ethical demands). 
277. See PETTIT, supra note 11, at 212 (quoting John Trenchard’s observation that people “are 
Free, where their Magistrates . . . act by Rules prescribed them by the People: And they are Slaves, 
where, their magistrates choose their own Rules, and follow their Lust and Humours”). 
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the better view is that fiduciary loyalty is concerned with a fiduciary’s actions 
and intentions, not her motivations.278 
The requirements of fidelity and affirmative devotion do not apply in 
equal measure to all fiduciary relationships.  As Gold and Miller have 
observed, some fiduciaries are entrusted with power primarily for the purpose 
of advancing the interests of designated beneficiaries (e.g., guardianships), 
while others receive broad purposive mandates that do not specify discrete 
beneficiaries (e.g., charitable trusts).279  When fiduciary relationships fall on 
the latter end of the spectrum, the requirement of fidelity to instructions will 
predominate over the requirement of affirmative devotion to beneficiaries’ 
best interests in some aspects of a fiduciary’s performance.  The relative 
salience of fidelity and affirmative devotion thus depends upon the purpose 
and design of particular fiduciary relationships. 
3. Fairness and Evenhandedness.—The duty of loyalty also 
emancipates beneficiaries from domination by ensuring that they are treated 
fairly and evenhandedly in fiduciary relationships involving rivalrous 
beneficiary claims.  For example, when investors commit their resources to 
a hedge fund, they face not only the threat that the manager might engage in 
self-dealing but also the possibility that the manager might arbitrarily confer 
a disproportionate share of the profits on some favored investors to the 
detriment of others.  In such cases, “the discrete fiduciary duty of loyalty is 
necessarily transformed into duties of fairness and reasonableness.”280  This 
requirement of fair and evenhanded treatment emancipates beneficiaries with 
rivalrous interests by requiring fiduciaries to exercise entrusted power in a 
manner that respects the beneficiaries’ formal equality. 
4. Conflict Avoidance.—The republican theory of fiduciary law also 
provides a strong counterpoint to classical liberalism’s argument for diluting 
the duty of loyalty’s uncompromising no-conflict and no-profit rules.  As 
discussed in Part II, classical liberalism posits that there is nothing inherently 
immoral about a fiduciary profiting from a conflicted transaction, as long as 
the transaction also benefits the principal.  Accordingly, classical liberalism 
characterizes the no-conflict and no-profit rules as prophylactic checks 
 
278. See Markovits, supra note 6, at 220 (“Legal obligations—both contractual and fiduciary—
turn on intentions not motivations.”). 
279. Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 
517 (2015). 
280. FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE, supra note 17, at 34–35; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (providing that “the trustee 
must act impartially and with due regard for the diverse beneficial interests created by the terms of 
the trust”); P.D. Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND 
TRENDS 131, 138 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995) (“It is uncontroversial fiduciary law that where a 
fiduciary serves classes of beneficiaries possessing different rights, . . . the fiduciary is . . . required 
to act fairly as between different classes of beneficiary in taking decisions which affect the rights 
and interests of the classes inter se.”). 
CRIDDLE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2017  1:40 PM 
1048 Texas Law Review [Vol. 95:993 
against opportunism: by prohibiting all self-interested transactions and profit 
taking without a principal’s consent—regardless of a fiduciary’s intent or 
whether the beneficiary has been harmed—fiduciary law eliminates a 
fiduciary’s incentives to abuse her position and lowers the principal’s 
monitoring and bonding costs.  Experts have argued that these rules also 
correct for information asymmetries by preventing a fiduciary from 
exploiting the fact that she “controls all evidence of the relationship and can 
easily conceal wrongdoing from the vulnerable party or the court.”281  Yet, 
as Langbein has argued, in theory these concerns can all be addressed in a 
less onerous way: by placing the burden squarely on fiduciaries to 
demonstrate that unauthorized conflicted transactions maximized 
beneficiaries’ profits (or minimized losses) relative to other available 
opportunities.282 
The republican theory of fiduciary law flatly rejects this reasoning.  
According to the republican theory, an agent, trustee, or corporate director 
has no legal authority to use fiduciary power in the service of her own ends 
and, accordingly, may not retain any profits that result from transactions 
associated with the fiduciary office.283  The other-regarding character of the 
fiduciary office requires a fiduciary to reserve any surplus generated by 
conflicted transactions for the benefit of her principal.284  A fiduciary’s 
withholding of this surplus to any degree constitutes a betrayal of trust that is 
inimical to the other-regarding character of the fiduciary relationship.  This 
abuse of trust is wrongful even if it does not harm the beneficiaries’ material 
interests.285  Accordingly, a party who holds fiduciary power may not use that 
power to advance her own self-interest unilaterally (i.e., without informed 
consent), even if such action indisputably promotes her beneficiaries’ 
interests. 
Significantly, if a fiduciary truly believes that a conflicted transaction 
will best promote her beneficiaries’ interests, the no-conflict and no-profit 
 
281. Getzler, supra note 83, at 586. 
282. Langbein, supra note 77, at 981. 
283. See ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 11 (3d ed. 1955) (reviewing the history of the no-conflict 
and no-profit rules of fiduciary duty).  The no-conflict and no-profit rules do not, however, preclude 
a fiduciary from receiving reasonable fees for services rendered pursuant to contract or with judicial 
approval. 
284. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
559, 563 (2006) (“A fiduciary who wrongfully makes a personal gain through the use of his position, 
or of property or information that he holds through his position, must disgorge that gain to his 
beneficiary even if the beneficiary has suffered no loss from the wrong.”). 
285. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between wrongs and harms, see ARTHUR 
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 30–56 (2009). 
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rules do not actually preclude the transaction from taking place;286 the 
fiduciary need only take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the potential 
conflict from introducing domination.  The fiduciary may disclose the 
potential conflict and obtain beneficiaries’ advance consent to the 
transaction’s terms, thereby authorizing her to withhold profits acquired in a 
personal capacity through the transaction.287  Or she may voluntarily 
relinquish all profits accrued in her personal capacity in order to satisfy her 
fiduciary obligation to reserve all surplus generated by the transaction for her 
beneficiaries.288  Either choice would eliminate the conflict of interest, defuse 
the fiduciary’s capacity for alien control, and thereby satisfy the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty.  There is no inherent conflict, therefore, between a fiduciary 
acting in her beneficiaries’ “sole interest” while also advancing their “best 
interests.” 
The republican theory thus opposes classical liberalism’s call to scale 
back or eliminate fiduciary law’s traditional no-conflict and no-profit rules.  
In particular, it shows how Delaware’s “entire fairness” test, which permits 
corporate directors to engage in self-interested transactions without informed 
consent, subjects corporations (and thereby, indirectly, their shareholders) to 
domination.289  It also explains why recent efforts to scale back the duty of 
loyalty in agency and trust law should be resisted in the interest of 
safeguarding liberty. 
5. The Mandatory Core.—Although this Article cannot address every 
aspect of the duty of loyalty, one final contribution of the republican theory 
merits brief consideration: the theory’s novel justification for fiduciary law’s 
“mandatory core.”290  Some scholars of law and economics have argued that 
all fiduciary duties are contractual default rules and therefore should be freely 
waivable with beneficiaries’ informed consent.291  Others have asserted, 
 
286. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (explaining the 
specific exemptions to the no-conflict rule, including transactions allowed by consent of all 
beneficiaries). 
287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (providing that 
an agent may obtain a material benefit arising out of her position when she obtains her principal’s 
consent). 
288. Id. § 8.02 cmt. e (describing available remedies when an agent obtains a material benefit 
arising out of her position without having secured her principal’s consent). 
289. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2016) (explaining the “entire fairness” test, 
where a corporate director may engage in conflicted transactions without informed consent of 
beneficiaries), with PETTIT, supra note 11, at 31–41 (discussing the republican tradition and its 
association with nondomination). 
290. Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1046. 
291. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 26, at 71–72 (arguing for a new concept of the 
corporation that recognizes the power of private ordering, market forces, and “private controls on 
managerial conduct,” while deemphasizing the role of fiduciary duties); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 7, at 427, 431–32 (theorizing that “a ‘fiduciary’ relation is a contractual one” and that 
courts “setting out to protect principals from their agents must use the hypothetical contract 
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however, that economic theory can support treating some loyalty 
requirements as mandatory rules.292  In arguably the most sophisticated 
economic defense of mandatory rules, Robert Sitkoff asserts that the duty of 
loyalty’s “mandatory core” serves two functions: (1) it “insulates fiduciary 
obligations that the law assumes would not be bargained away by a fully 
informed, sophisticated principal”;293 and (2) it provides “clean lines of 
demarcation across types of legal relationships, among other things to 
minimize third-party information costs.”294  Viewed from this perspective, 
classical liberalism can support mandatory rules as autonomy-reinforcing 
safeguards that address the risks of harm that arise in fiduciary relationships. 
The republican theory offers a different justification for fiduciary law’s 
mandatory core.  Although republicanism generally supports allowing 
principals to structure fiduciary relationships in ways that deviate from 
fiduciary law’s baseline rules, this concession to individual choice has a 
nonnegotiable limit: Fiduciary relationships may not be structured in a 
manner that subjects beneficiaries’ legal or practical interests to a fiduciary’s 
unfettered alien control. 
This bedrock nondomination principle explains and justifies the current 
features of fiduciary law’s mandatory core.  It supports the rule that a 
principal may not authorize a fiduciary to act in bad faith or otherwise violate 
the terms or purposes of the fiduciary relationship.295  Nor may beneficiaries 
waive the fiduciary duty to provide information relevant to informed 
consent.296  The nondomination principle also reinforces courts’ common 
practice of construing waivers of fiduciary duties narrowly to ensure that 
consent is fully informed.297  These features of contemporary fiduciary law 
 
approach” to determine whether fiduciary duties apply); Langbein, supra note 7, at 658 (observing 
that fiduciary duties are prevailingly, if not obviously, contractarian; “[c]ontract is there, but not 
always at first glance”); Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1046 (“[V]arious fiduciary duties are for the most 
part default rules that apply unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”). 
292. See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 1046 (theorizing “mandatory rules” of the “fiduciary 
obligation that cannot be overridden by agreement”). 
293. Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 205. 
294. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 112, at 1624 (“[T]hird-party effects justify a certain 
minimum level of judicial paternalism . . . .”). 
295. See Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 663–64 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that stockholder 
ratification is not a “blank check” for conflicted transactions that cannot plausibly be interpreted as 
advancing the corporation’s best interests); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96(1)(a) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2007) (providing that an exculpation clause is unenforceable if it purports to relieve a 
trustee “of liability for a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with indifference to the fiduciary 
duties of the trustee, the terms or purposes of the trust, or the interests of the beneficiaries”). 
296. See, e.g., Sample, 914 A.2d at 664–67 (holding that director ratification cannot preclude a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty if the directors failed to disclose material facts). 
297. See Deborah A. DeMott, Defining Agency and its Scope (II), in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT 
LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 396, 398 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg eds., 
2016) (“[A] principal’s consent to conduct that would otherwise breach a fiduciary duty requires 
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are necessary to prevent principals and beneficiaries from placing their legal 
and practical interests under fiduciaries’ “uncontrolled discretion.”298  Just as 
courts will not enforce contracts in which one person consents to become 
another’s slave or involuntary servant,299 principals and beneficiaries may not 
contract to subject their legal or practical interests to a fiduciary’s alien 
control through general waivers of fiduciary duties. 
D. Understanding Fiduciary Remedies 
Another important contribution of the republican theory is the link it 
forges between the formal legal character of fiduciary power and the 
remedies that courts have traditionally offered to address breaches of the duty 
of loyalty.  Fiduciary theorists who embrace classical liberalism tend to 
characterize traditional fiduciary remedies, such as constructive trust and 
disgorgement, as supracompensatory measures that deter opportunism.300  In 
contrast, the republican theory suggests that these remedies are appropriate 
to support the principle that a fiduciary is legally incapable of holding or 
exercising fiduciary power except in trust for her principal and 
beneficiaries.301 
The republican theory’s account of fiduciary remedies closely tracks 
Paul Miller’s juridical theory of fiduciary remedies.302  In a series of path-
breaking publications, Miller has argued that the distinctive feature of 
fiduciary relationships is that a fiduciary “stands in substitution for the 
beneficiary or a benefactor in exercising a legal capacity that is ordinarily 
derived from the beneficiary or benefactor’s legal personality.”303  Because 
in Miller’s view the legal rights exercised by a fiduciary are vested in the 
 
specificity.”); Miller, supra note 2, at 1006 (observing that “broad waivers or contractual clauses 
purporting to completely exclude fiduciary liability are usually read down or held void”). 
298. In re Will of Allister, 545 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). 
299. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime . . . , shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”). 
300. See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1115–16 (1988) (discussing how stricter fiduciary 
rules help “deter conduct by the fiduciary that is inconsistent with the . . . welfare of the 
beneficiaries”); Smith, supra note 64, at 1404 (“[F]iduciary law can be justified on the grounds that 
it deters opportunistic behavior.”); cf. James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and 
Wrongs, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1869, 1876 (2001) (asserting that courts apply “disgorgement damages” 
to fiduciary relationships because “there is a profound need for deterrence not fulfilled by 
compensatory damages”). 
301. See, e.g., SHEPHERD, supra note 165, at 93 (“The essence of this theory of fiduciary 
relationships is that powers are a species of property, which can be beneficially owned by one person 
while being exercised by another person, who may be referred to as the legal owner of the power.”). 
302. See Miller, supra note 163, at 69 (defining “[a] fiduciary relationship [as] one in which 
one party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power over the significant practical interests of 
another (the beneficiary)”). 
303. Id. at 70–71. 
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principal or beneficiary rather than the fiduciary, “[t]he fiduciary may not 
treat fiduciary power as an unclaimed means or as a personal means.”304  
Instead, the fiduciary must treat her beneficiary always as the exclusive 
beneficiary of her exercise of entrusted power.  Miller argues that 
disgorgement is an appropriate remedy for fiduciary disloyalty, because 
within a fiduciary relationship “[n]o one is entitled to gain from the execution 
of a fiduciary mandate save the beneficiary; to the extent that there are such 
gains, they belong to the beneficiary.”305  In Miller’s view, therefore, the no-
profit rule reflects the simple principle that a beneficiary is entitled to enjoy 
the full benefits of the exercise of her own legal powers.306 
The republican theory refines Miller’s juridical account of fiduciary 
remedies by elucidating its implicit normative underpinnings.  Consistent 
with Miller’s account, fiduciary remedies affirm that fiduciaries may not 
dominate their beneficiaries by treating entrusted fiduciary power as an 
instrument for advancing their own interests without beneficiaries’ 
consent.307  Giving beneficiaries the option to seek rescission of unauthorized 
conflicted transactions promotes freedom from domination by affirming that 
fiduciaries lack the legal capacity to use fiduciary power for their own benefit 
unilaterally.  If beneficiaries conclude that an unauthorized conflicted 
transaction was, in fact, the best option for maximizing their own profits (or 
minimizing losses), they may elect to leave the transaction intact and compel 
the fiduciary to hold, and ultimately disgorge, any profits generated by the 
transaction.308  Constructive trust and disgorgement thus prevent the 
fiduciary from dictating unilaterally the terms under which profits generated 
by a conflicted transaction will be divided between herself and her 
beneficiaries.  Collectively, these traditional fiduciary remedies prevent a 
fiduciary from wielding alien control over her beneficiaries’ legal and 
practical interests. 
The republican theory clarifies why disgorgement is justified in settings 
where fiduciary disloyalty produces gains that principals and beneficiaries 
would not be entitled to generate for themselves.  Consider the case of a 
fiduciary who accepts bribes from a third party.  Courts routinely hold that 
public officials who accept bribes violate their duty of loyalty and must 
relinquish bribes to their government employers.309  Disgorgement of bribes 
 
304. Miller, supra note 2, at 1021. 
305. Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 570, 616 (2013). 
306. Id. at 616–17. 
307. See, e.g., id. at 585 (noting that a fiduciary is subject to fiduciary liability when the 
fiduciary allows his own interests or those of a third party to “actually or potentially . . . conflict 
with the interests of the beneficiary”). 
308. See MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 79, at 186. 
309. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1909) (requiring an agent to account 
to his principal for any benefit received in “violation of his duty”); United States v. Drumm, 329 
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exposes a tension within Miller’s juridical account of fiduciary law because 
a public official cannot be understood in any meaningful sense to have been 
entrusted with authority to collect bribes.310  Moreover, as Deborah DeMott 
has observed, even if the concept of entrusted power  
is defined more broadly, perhaps as the power to deal with third parties 
on the principal’s behalf, the facts that the power was used for an 
illegal end, and thus that the principal could not itself directly use the 
power to the same end, make it hard to explain why the proceeds of 
the transaction belong to the principal.311 
Federal courts wrestled with this question during the late 1980s, when 
they were asked to decide whether bribery constituted a form of fraud under 
the federal mail fraud statute.312  In McNally v. United States,313 the Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction of a Kentucky state official who had 
participated in a self-dealing patronage scheme because the jury in the case 
had not been asked to decide whether the official had defrauded the state of 
any money or property.314  The Court based its decision, in part, on the idea 
that the state lacked an ownership interest in kickbacks from government 
contractors.315  Justice Stevens conceded this point in his dissent, but he 
argued that the defendant, as a state official, was duty bound to deliver 
anything he received “as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to the 
principal.”316  He therefore asserted that “[t]his duty may fulfill the Court’s 
‘money or property’ requirement in most kickback schemes.”317  Following 
McNally, however, lower federal courts overwhelmingly rejected Justice 
 
F.2d 109, 113 (1st Cir. 1964) (holding an agent accountable for “all profits in excess of his lawful 
compensation”); United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75–77 (D.D.C. 
2008) (noting that an agent with two “paymasters” necessarily creates a conflict of interest and that 
failing to disclose and seek approval for the additional payment constituted a breach of fiduciary 
duty warranting disgorgement); Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 11–15 (N.J. 1955) (allowing the 
recovery of money taken wrongfully from the principal by the agent through restitution, thus 
preventing the “unfaithful public official” from wrongfully profiting). 
310. Compare Miller, supra note 163, at 70–71 (suggesting that fiduciary power derives from 
a beneficiary’s legal capacities), with Miller, supra note 305, at 600 (asserting that disgorgement of 
bribes can be justified based on a beneficiary’s “quasi-proprietary” right to fiduciary loyalty itself). 
311. DeMott, supra note 209, at 912–13. 
312. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); see also id. § 1346 (defining “scheme or artifice to defraud” as 
including a “scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services”). 
313. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
314. Id. at 360–61. 
315. Id. at 351, 360. 
316. Id. at 365–66, 377 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)). 
317. Id.  Justice O’Connor joined all of Justice Stevens’s dissent except the concluding section 
that contained this proposal.  Id. at 362. 
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Stevens’s duty-based theory.318  Following Judge Posner’s lead,319 several 
circuits reasoned that disgorgement of bribes might be justified under 
fiduciary law as a deterrence measure, but they flatly rejected the idea that 
this remedy could be based on a governmental property interest in bribes.320 
The republican theory developed in this Article offers a different 
justification for fiduciary law’s disgorgement remedy and, in so doing, 
clarifies why the government is entitled to demand disgorgement of bribes as 
a civil remedy for breach of fiduciary duty.  Consistent with Miller’s juridical 
theory, the republican theory takes disgorgement on its own terms as a 
remedy for wrongful withholding of property rather than as a prophylactic or 
compensatory measure.  The republican theory avoids the implausible 
suggestion that the government has a property right in bribes.  Instead, the 
disgorgement remedy tracks the other-regarding character of the fiduciary 
office itself: when acting within the scope of her office, a fiduciary is legally 
incapable of accepting assets except in trust for her beneficiaries.321  As the 
Supreme Court has explained in another landmark corruption case, United 
States v. Carter,322 disgorgement “results not from the subject-matter but 
from the fiduciary character of the one against whom it is applied.”323  Hence, 
disgorgement is not dependent upon a finding that the government would be 
entitled to receive bribery payments in the absence of a public official’s 
disloyalty, nor is it contingent upon a finding or presumption that the 
 
318. See, e.g., United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1422–24 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the 
“duty of loyalty” theory that would make a government employee guilty of mail fraud against his 
employer for accepting bribes); United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1491–92 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(en banc) (holding that the constructive trust theory is not sufficient to sustain a mail fraud 
conviction for lost intangible rights); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 525–27 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(noting that the Supreme Court effectively rejected Justice Stevens’s argument in McNally and that 
the courts may not “recharacterize every breach of fiduciary duty as a financial harm”); United 
States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1346–48 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that the placement of bribe money 
into a constructive trust does not make it government property for the purpose of a mail fraud 
conviction).  But see United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1186–88 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that bribes are “a benefit which properly belongs to the [state], which is the principal, rather than 
the official, officer, or employee, who is merely a fiduciary-agent”), rev’d and vacated en banc, 877 
F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1989). 
319. See Holzer, 840 F.2d at 1348 (Posner, J.) (“A constructive trust is imposed on the bribes 
not because [a public servant] . . . failed to account for money received on the state’s account but in 
order to deter bribery by depriving the bribed official of the benefit of the bribes.”). 
320. Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1422–24; Shelton, 848 F.2d at 1491–92. 
321. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“If an agent 
receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to the principal, he is subject to a 
liability to deliver it, its value, or its proceeds, to the principal.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
RESTITUTION § 197 (AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the 
beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or other profit, he holds what he receives 
upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary.”). 
322. 217 U.S. 286 (1910). 
323. Id. at 306. 
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government suffered financial or other material harm from the bribery.324  
Under the republican theory, the fact that a public official’s entrusted position 
of authority enables him to obtain bribes is enough to trigger the requirement 
that he hold the assets in trust and relinquish them to his employer for the 
public’s benefit.  The violation of this requirement wrongs a fiduciary’s 
beneficiaries by betraying the other-regarding terms of the fiduciary’s 
entrusted power, irrespective of whether beneficiaries suffer material 
harm.325  Disgorgement in this context thus affirms the fiduciary character of 
public offices by ensuring that “[t]he citizen is not at the mercy of his servants 
holding positions of public trust.”326 
E. The Divergence of Fiduciary Conduct and Decision Rules 
The republican theory also helps to explain the deferential standards of 
review that courts have applied across many fields of fiduciary law.  
Although courts often assert that fiduciaries must pursue their principals’ 
objectives with “utmost good faith,” observing “the highest standards of 
honor and honesty,”327 they rarely find a breach of fiduciary duty absent 
evidence of egregious abuse.  Perhaps the best known example of this 
phenomenon is corporate law’s “business judgment rule,” which requires 
courts to accept business decisions that disinterested directors have made 
deliberatively and in good faith—even if those decisions ultimately harmed 
the interests of the corporation or its stockholders.328  Corporate law is hardly 
unique, however, in its deferential approach to fiduciary decision making.  
Courts also apply a healthy measure of deference to fiduciaries’ discretionary 
 
324. See Hawaiian Int’l Fins., Inc. v. Pablo, 488 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Haw. 1971) (stating that the 
rule against a fiduciary retaining a bonus, commission, or other profit from third parties “is 
applicable although the profit received by the fiduciary is not at the expense of the beneficiary” 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 197 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1937)). 
325. See Bos. Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell [1888] 39 Ch. D. 339 at 357 (Eng. & 
Wales) (Cotton, L.J.) (concluding that “where an agent . . . without the knowledge or assent of [the] 
principal, receives money from the person with whom he is dealing, he is doing a wrongful act” and 
must relinquish the money to the principal). 
326. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 222 (N.J. 1952). 
327. Grossberg v. Haffenberg, 11 N.E.2d 359, 360 (Ill. 1937); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (defining a director’s duty of loyalty as an “unyielding fiduciary 
duty to [pursue the purposes and interests of] the corporation and its shareholders”), overruled on 
other grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 
(Del. 1939) (describing the duty of loyalty as a “rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, 
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, . . . affirmatively to 
protect the interests of the corporation”). 
328. See D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 83, 83 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) 
(describing the traditional business judgment rule as a mechanism to shield corporate directors from 
liability for “honest mistakes” when the directors made the decision in a careful, loyal, and good-
faith manner). 
CRIDDLE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2017  1:40 PM 
1056 Texas Law Review [Vol. 95:993 
judgments in other contexts, including trust law329 and bankruptcy law.330  
These deferential standards of review have produced a stark divergence 
between the legal “conduct rules” that formally regulate fiduciary 
performance (e.g., diligence, affirmative devotion) and the deferential 
“decision rules” that govern judicial review in some contexts (e.g., 
negligence, intentional malfeasance).331 
The republican theory lends support for the idea that a fiduciary’s “duty 
of the finest loyalty” is a genuine legal obligation rooted in the fiduciary 
relationship itself, and not merely an aspirational moral or social norm.332  
The strict conduct rules that flow from this general obligation (e.g., fidelity 
to instructions, affirmative devotion to beneficiaries, and fairness and 
evenhandedness) safeguard liberty by ensuring that a fiduciary lacks the 
formal legal capacity to use entrusted power as a form of alien control over 
the legal or practical interests of her beneficiaries.  These conduct rules 
pervasively regulate fiduciary power, constituting fiduciary relationships 
juridically in a manner that formally rules out domination. 
At the same time, the republican theory is sensitive to the fact that 
formal conduct rules are not sufficient to secure freedom from domination in 
practice.  Recall that for republicans, liberty is constituted not only by liberty-
affirming conduct rules but also by effective legal and political institutions.  
The republican theory’s success depends in no small part, therefore, on courts 
implementing fiduciary law in a manner that promotes liberty. 
The challenge for republicans is that judges, like other fiduciaries, have 
the practical capacity to exercise arbitrary power.333  To guard against the 
threat of judicial domination, courts must calibrate fiduciary law’s decision 
rules to prevent judicial oversight from increasing overall net domination in 
 
329. E.g., Crabb v. Young, 92 N.Y. 56, 66 (N.Y. 1883) (“[W]hile trustees are . . . held to great 
strictness in their dealings with the interests of their beneficiaries, the court will regard them 
leniently when it appears they have acted in good faith, and if no improper motive can be attributed 
to them, the court have even excused an apparent breach of trust, unless the negligence is very 
gross.”). 
330. See, e.g., In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 45, 50 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[The] judge . . . 
is not to substitute her judgment for that of the [bankruptcy] trustee, and the trustee’s judgment is 
to be accorded some deference.” (quoting In re Moorhead Corp., 208 B.R. 87, 90 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 
1997))). 
331. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards 
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437–38 (1993) (commenting on the 
variance between “standards of conduct” that set forth how to perform an activity and “standards of 
review” that govern the associated litigation in corporate law); Julian Velasco, The Role of 
Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 521–22 (2012) (“Courts 
often opine on the relatively demanding standard of conduct, but their judgments must be based on 
the more forgiving standard of review.”). 
332. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
333. See Getzler, supra note 83, at 598 (noting Peter Birks’s concern that moralistic 
formulations of fiduciary loyalty may “descend into a formless anarchy of opinion,” serving as “a 
prelude to power-mongering and tyranny”). 
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fiduciary relationships.334  Yasmin Dawood refers to this approach to judicial 
oversight as the “antidomination model” of judicial review.335 
Under the republican theory’s antidomination model and consistent with 
prevailing practice, judicial deference to fiduciary judgments turns on two 
considerations.  First, courts should respect the fact that in a variety of 
contexts the law entrusts fiduciaries with discretionary authority to decide 
what particular measures will best advance their principals’ purposes and 
their beneficiaries’ interests.336  Second, courts should take into account that 
they are poorly equipped to evaluate whether some fiduciary decisions satisfy 
the duty of loyalty.  How much judicial deference is appropriate in a 
particular context depends upon the interplay between these two 
considerations. 
Whenever a fiduciary exercises entrusted discretionary power, the 
republican theory supports highly deferential decision rules.  For example, 
courts wisely apply a strong form of deference when they review guardians’ 
discretionary judgments regarding the interests of their wards.337  The law 
entrusts guardians with sweeping responsibility to ascertain and develop 
strategies to advance the best interests of their beneficiaries.338  By virtue of 
their regular contact with their wards, guardians are typically in a better 
position than judges to discern what measures will maximize their wards’ 
idiosyncratic preferences.339  Corporate law’s business judgment rule reflects 
similar concerns.  Courts defer to corporate directors’ discretionary business 
decisions because directors are primarily responsible to decide what 
measures will best advance their corporation’s purposes, and courts usually 
lack the information and expertise necessary to second-guess those 
decisions.340  Were courts to conduct de novo review of such decisions, they 
 
334. See Dawood, supra note 50, at 1418 (arguing that the purpose of judicial intervention is 
“to prevent the most dominating . . . action with judicial intervention that is the least dominating”). 
335. Id. 
336. See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) (providing 
that, as long as the fiduciary acts in the best interests of the principal, the fiduciary is not subject to 
liability). 
337. See, e.g., J.A. ex rel. Atkins v. Ja-Ru, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 3640 (DAB)(KNF), 2011 WL 
990167, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011) (“A court’s role in reviewing a proposed infant compromise 
is to ensure the settlement is ‘fair and reasonable and in the infant plaintiff’s best interests.’” 
(quoting Edionwe v. Hussain, 777 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996))). 
338. See, e.g., Stahl v. Rhee, 643 N.Y.S.2d 148, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“In a case where 
reasonable minds may legitimately differ, the judgment of the infant’s natural guardian should 
prevail.”). 
339. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (explaining that the law has historically 
recognized that “natural bonds of affection” result in parents acting in their children’s best interests); 
Atkins, 2011 WL 990167, at *3 (giving “significant [judicial] deference” to the infant–plaintiff’s 
mother regarding what settlement proposal was in the best interests of her son). 
340. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (observing that “[t]he business 
judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power 
granted to Delaware directors”). 
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would substitute more dominating judicial review for less dominating 
fiduciary decision making.  Accordingly, courts may safeguard liberty most 
effectively in these contexts by giving fiduciaries a wide berth and 
interceding only when beneficiaries present clear and convincing evidence of 
abuse or neglect.341 
 What if a decision has not been entrusted to a fiduciary’s 
discretionary judgment, but the fiduciary possesses expertise that is relevant 
to the inquiry and superior to that of the court?  Consider, for example, the 
case of a corporate director who is accused of failing to pursue her 
corporation’s best interests in good faith.342  Courts are usually poorly 
equipped to second-guess a corporate director’s testimony that she actually 
believed in good faith that her actions would advance the corporation’s best 
interests.343  In such cases, the republican theory counsels that courts should 
offset their own capacity for arbitrary interference by according respectful 
consideration to a fiduciary’s judgments.  But courts should not retreat too 
far.  At a minimum, they should require a corporate director to demonstrate 
that her decision-making process was not unreasoned, uninformed, patently 
irrational, or intentionally or recklessly indifferent to the corporation’s 
interests.  As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he presumptive 
validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where the 
decision under attack is ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment 
that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.’”344  
By placing the burden on a fiduciary to articulate a nonarbitrary rationale for 
her decisions, courts can protect beneficiaries from being dominated by their 
fiduciaries while simultaneously minimizing their own capacity to exert alien 
control over the fiduciary relationship. 
Conversely, when neither of the two considerations favoring deference 
applies, courts should not hesitate to enforce fiduciary law’s “unbending and 
inveterate” conduct rules without according any special deference to the 
fiduciary.345  De novo review is the appropriate standard, therefore, when 
evaluating whether a trustee or corporate director has engaged in fraud or 
 
341. See, e.g., In re Beidel Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 29, 31 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1958) (“It is . . . 
the task of the guardian in the performance of its duties to determine whether a proposed expenditure 
is necessary for the care, maintenance or education of the minor.  The Court should not be asked to 
perform the guardian’s function.”). 
342. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66–67 (Del. 2006) (“A 
failure to act in good faith may be shown . . . where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose 
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation . . . .” (quoting with approval In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005))). 
343. See, e.g., In re PSE & G S’holders Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 315 (N.J. 2002) (accepting board 
member testimony denying any negligence in the absence of contradictory evidence). 
344. Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (quoting In re J.P. Stevens 
& Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988)). 
345. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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self-dealing in violation of their duty of loyalty.346  Such matters are not 
entrusted to a fiduciary’s discretionary judgment, and judges are better 
qualified to resolve them in a nonarbitrary manner.  Hence, de novo review 
of these issues is the best approach for minimizing overall net domination.   
Determining the optimal degree of separation between fiduciary law’s 
conduct and decision rules is obviously a very complex, context-sensitive 
challenge that this Article cannot fully work out in the limited space that 
remains.347  For present purposes, the critical point to appreciate is simply 
that the republican theory offers resources for tackling this problem.  In 
particular, it underscores that judicial standards of review must account for 
the comparative threats that fiduciary power and judicial power pose to 
freedom from domination.  Although the republican theory affirms that 
fiduciary law’s uncompromising conduct rules are genuine legal obligations, 
it supports deferential decision rules in many settings to ensure that judicial 
review does not increase overall, net domination in the fiduciary relationship.  
The republican theory thus clarifies how legislatures and courts should design 
judicial standards of review to maximize freedom from domination.   
Conclusion 
Fiduciary law is predicated on the idea that “[n]o man can serve two 
masters”: “‘the same person cannot act for himself, and at the same time, with 
respect to the same matter, as agent for another, whose interest might be in 
conflict with his’; nor can he be allowed to profit by his own wrong, even if 
such be only constructive wrong.”348  For nearly three centuries, jurists 
throughout the common law world have tried to justify this fundamental 
precept based on classical liberalism’s vision of freedom as noninterference, 
arguing that fiduciary law serves a prophylactic function, deterring fiduciary 
self-dealing and redressing the material harm caused by fiduciary 
opportunism.  Yet, as scholars who operate within this tradition have begun 
to recognize, classical liberalism does not offer a particularly compelling 
justification for preventing a fiduciary from serving two masters—her 
beneficiaries and herself—in transactions where both sides demonstrably 
 
346. See, e.g., Scrushy v. Tucker, 70 So. 3d 289, 312–13 (Ala. 2011) (holding that Delaware’s 
business judgment rule does not apply to fraud or other illegal activity). 
347. I take up this challenge in a forthcoming essay.  See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Law’s 
Mixed Messages, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon 
Smith eds., forthcoming 2018). 
348. City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812, 814 (Minn. 1913) (quoting Stone v. 
Bevans, 92 N.W. 520, 520 (Minn. 1902)); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) 
(stressing that a director “cannot by the intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient precept 
against serving two masters”). 
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stand to profit.349  Nor can classical liberalism credibly explain why 
constructive trust and disgorgement are appropriate remedies for fiduciary 
disloyalty.  Viewed purely from the perspective of classical liberalism, 
therefore, it is tempting to dismiss fiduciary law’s signature features as 
outdated relics of equity’s Bleak House era.350 
This Article has explained why the classical liberal critique of traditional 
fiduciary duties and remedies is unpersuasive.  Fiduciary law’s unique 
structure reflects a republican commitment to freedom from domination.  
Fiduciaries are not entitled to serve two masters—their beneficiaries and 
themselves—because fiduciary power would compromise beneficiaries’ 
liberty if it were not exercised for their exclusive benefit.  When fiduciaries 
engage in conflicted transactions without their beneficiaries’ informed 
consent, they may or may not harm their beneficiaries’ material interests, but 
they always wrong their beneficiaries by treating their office as an instrument 
for advancing their own unilateral interests in breach of the trust reposed in 
them.  The traditional fiduciary remedies of rescission, constructive trust, and 
disgorgement are perfectly suited to rectify this kind of wrong and thereby 
eliminate the domination that would otherwise plague fiduciary relationships.  
Fiduciary law thus safeguards liberty in relationships of trust and confidence 
by empowering private parties and emancipating them from domination. 
 
 
349. See Langbein, supra note 77, at 934–35 (disputing Bogert’s assertion that “[i]t is not 
possible for any person to act fairly in the same transaction on behalf of himself and in the interest 
of the trust beneficiary”). 
350. See supra note 128–30 and accompanying text. 
